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Abstract 
DIGITAL INTEGRATION: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT AND ITS 
ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICTORS 
 
By 
RICARDO MARTIN CHECCHI 
 
DATE 
July 28th, 2008 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Detmar W. Straub 
Major Department: Computer Information Systems 
 
This study investigates the impact of environmental factors on the decision to 
electronically integrate operations with international customers and/or suppliers.  The 
following research question motivates the study: How does the environmental context 
affect the level of electronic integration of an organization with its international 
partners?  This study elaborates on the concept of electronic integration.  Studies on 
integration in general and electronic integration in particular adopt a loose definition of 
integration: they all agree in that integration is the opposite of markets, but they define 
this opposite in different terms: relationship contracting, long-term contracting, 
coordination, etc.  Finally, the study also responds to Wathne and Heide’s (2004) call for 
a more comprehensive study of governance mechanisms in B2B, with emphasis on 
monitoring mechanisms. 
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Chapter 1 Motivation and Research Questions 
The arrival of the Internet and the explosion of new information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) has altered the economic and social landscape and 
created new forms of business relationships.  ICTs increase information flows, which in 
turn impact firm performance and competitiveness (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001; 
Malone et al. 1987; UNCTAD 2003).  Some of the benefits of the use of ICTs in 
business-to-business (B2B) include: reduction in transaction costs, better resource 
allocation, economies of scale, improved competitiveness, and increased availability of 
products and markets (UNCTAD 2003).  In spite of the apparently evident benefits of the 
use of ICTs in B2B (henceforth called e-business or eB2B), there are differences in take-
up both between and within countries (Teo et al. 2003).   
E-business adoption has lagged in developing countries, due to “lack of awareness 
of what ICT could offer, insufficient telecommunications infrastructure and Internet 
connectivity, expensive Internet access, absence of adequate legal and regulatory 
frameworks, shortage of requisite human capacity, failure to use local language and 
content, and lack of entrepreneurship and a business culture open to change, transparency 
and democracy” (UNCTAD 2003 p. 2).  Within country differences, on the other hand, 
are explained by factors such as coercive pressures from business partners, industry 
characteristics, and organizational size (Teo et al. 2003).   
These eB2B differences in adoption between and within countries have been 
studied from various perspectives, including but not limited to economics [mainly 
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transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory (AT)]; operations management, in 
particular supply chain management (SCM); industrial marketing, especially relational 
marketing (RM); information systems, focusing on inter-organizational systems (IOS) 
and linkages; social-economics, primarily network processes; and in diverse other fields 
that look at the cultural consequences embedded in the adoption of innovations.  The 
proposed study integrates these perspectives into a comprehensive framework and 
furthers past research by concentrating on the digital aspect of the eB2B relationship.   
In particular, the proposed study investigates the impact of environmental factors 
on the decision to electronically integrate operations with international customers and/or 
suppliers.  The following research question motivates the study: 
RQ1: How does the environmental context affect the level of electronic 
integration of an organization with its international partners? 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Background and Theory Development 
This dissertation has two main goals: (1) to further our understanding of 
electronic integration, and (2) to assess the environmental predictors of electronic 
integration.  First, studies on electronic integration (EI) adopt a loose and narrow 
definition of EI: EI is generally defined opposite of markets (Malone et al. 1987) and as a 
one-dimensional construct that relates to the proportion of business associated with a 
particular partner (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).  In this study we expand that 
definition.  Secondly, the tradition of economic anthropology posits that the structure of 
organizational relationships is determined by the settings in which they exist.  We focus 
on three dimensions of this setting: cognitive (uncertainty), cultural, and political (power) 
[adapted from Zukin and DiMaggio (1990)].   
The current section is structured as follows: first, we introduce the existing 
literature on integration and quasi-integration; second, based on the theories of 
integration we define digital integration, the criterion variable; we then describe the 
framework of embeddedness as defined by Zukin and DiMaggio (1990); finally, we 
elaborate on each of the types of embeddedness considered in the present work. 
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2.1 Electronic Integration 
2.1.1 Integration and quasi-integration 
The focus of the study is the integration of the operations of partnering 
organizations via electronic media.  As such, we first examine the definition and structure 
of integration and then the digital (electronic) component.  Integration is generally 
defined as “control over decisions” (Heide and John 1992 p. 33).  In the literature, 
integration has been researched mainly from two perspectives: vertical integration and 
coordination/collaboration.  Rather than being competing or complementary approaches, 
these perspectives focus on similar phenomena in different domains.  These studies 
investigate issues related to the governance and control of the exchange.  The domains 
vary from financial commitment to coordination.   
Vertical integration relies on financial forms of governance, i.e., ownership, as 
ways to attain control over a resource or relationship.  Coordination/collaboration, on the 
other hand, relies on entrepreneurial forms of governance, e.g., contracts, social norms, 
and trust, as ways to attain control over a resource or relationship.  Traditionally, these 
perspectives have been studied separately and while they treat the extremes similarly (the 
market is regarded as having no ownership of supply lines, short-term contracts or 
transactions; hierarchy is defined as ownership of supply lines, long-term contracts or 
vertical integration), they take different roads when it comes to partial ownership versus 
non-ownership relational agreements.  Some studies bridge these different intellectual 
stances by positing that quasi-integration (no ownership) can be a substitute for vertical 
integration (ownership) (Blois 1972; Blois 1980; Heide and John 1990; Zaheer and 
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Venkatraman 1994) whereas in the extreme, a quasi-firm (or quasi-hierarchy) would be 
formed instead of a hierarchy (Eccles 1981; Granovetter 1985).  Figure 1 depicts the 
dichotomy between vertical integration and coordination/collaboration and the position of 
the different types of governance modes described in the literature.  To fully understand 
the implications of this graphic, however, we need to further explore the concept of 
governance. 
Markets
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Network
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Figure 1. Two perspectives of integration  
(adapted and expanded from Seppälä (2001; 2003) and Webster (1992)) 
 
One definition of governance is that it is the set of “formal and informal rules of 
exchange between partners” (Griffith and Myers 2005 p. 255).  Several theoretical bases 
have been applied to the study of governance in inter-organizational relationships (see 
Table 1).  The most relevant of these are: agency theory (AT), resource dependency 
theory (RDT), transaction cost economics (TCE), relational view (RV), relational 
exchange theory (RET), and the information processing view (InfoView) of the firm.  
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This section describes interorganizational relationships from the perspectives mentioned, 
and then conceptualizes electronic integration based on these perspectives.   
2.1.1.1 Agency Theory: Alignment and Control 
Given that buyer-supplier relationships are cooperative relationships, i.e., agency 
relationships, they are subject to agency costs, even though there are no clear-cut 
principal-agent roles (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  An agency relationship is a contract 
under which a person or organization (the principal) uses the services of another person 
or organization (the agent) “to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling 1976 p. 
5).  Agency theory proposes that governance mechanisms are designed and put in place 
in order to mitigate the agency conflicts existing in the relationship (Jensen and Meckling 
1976 p. 7).   
The most salient mechanisms in the structure of the relationship are behavioral 
and outcome monitoring and risk sharing through incentives –rewards and/or 
punishments–(Eisenhardt 1985; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  The agency conflicts are 
usually related to management of resources.  Agency theory, however, is not the only 
theory that looks at management or control over resources. 
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Table 1. Theories applied to the study of inter-organizational relationships 
Theory Assumptions Thesis Integration 
Terms 
Used 
Theoretical 
Components 
Effect on IORs Source 
Agency 
Theory (AT) 
Agent and principal 
have different goals 
and behave 
selfishly 
Governance mechanisms 
are enacted to mitigate 
the agency conflicts 
existing in the 
relationship 
Relational 
contract 
• Risk sharing 
• Monitoring 
Self-interests
 
Observability
? Control mechanisms 
Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976) 
Eisenhardt 
(1985) 
Resource 
Depend-
ency Theory 
(RDT) 
Power dependence 
bases are influenced 
by the allocation of 
resources 
Firms integrate (or quasi-
integrate) vertically to 
acquire control over 
valued resources 
Hierarchy 
 
Relational 
contract 
• Ownership 
 
• Long-term contract 
Mutual 
dependence
 
Power 
imbalance 
? Vertical integration 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik 
(1978)  
Pfeffer 
(1987) 
Transaction 
Cost 
Economics 
(TCE) 
There are certain 
transaction costs 
that are lost in spot-
like relationships 
Efficiencies result from 
establishing transaction-
specific structures 
Hierarchy 
 
Quasi-
hierarchy 
 
• Ownership 
 
• Long-term contract 
Transaction Specific 
Assets  
Opportunism
 
Uncertainty  
?
Vertical 
(quasi-) 
integration 
Williamso
n (1975; 
1979) 
Relational 
View (RV) 
Firms might obtain 
competitive 
advantages from the 
relationships they 
have with other 
firms. 
Firms establish relation-
specific structures to 
leverage those 
advantages 
Interfirm 
resources 
and routines
• Relation-specific assets
• Knowledge sharing 
routines 
• Complementary 
resources and 
capabilities 
• Governance 
mechanisms 
Interfirm 
resources and 
routines 
? Relational rents 
Dyer and 
Singh 
(1988) 
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Table 1. Theories applied to the study of inter-organizational relationships 
Theory Assumptions Thesis Integration 
Terms 
Used 
Theoretical 
Components 
Effect on IORs Source 
Relational 
Exchange 
Theory 
(RET) 
Social norms must 
be respected to 
have successful 
long-term 
relationships 
Social norms within a 
relationship are a 
complement to 
contracting 
Social 
contracting 
(Relational 
norms) 
• Solidarity 
• Mutuality 
• Flexibility 
• Role integrity 
• Information sharing 
Relational 
norms ?
Relationship 
performance 
Macneil 
(1980); 
Heide and 
John 
(1992)  
Information 
Processing 
View 
(InfoView) 
Firms have 
information 
processing needs 
that derive from 
uncertainty 
Firms create information 
processing mechanisms 
to cope with uncertainty 
Coordina-
tion 
mechanism
s 
• Slack resources 
• Self-contained tasks 
• Vertical integration 
systems 
• Lateral relationships 
Uncertainty ? Coordination mechanisms 
Galbraith 
(1973) 
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2.1.1.2 Resource Dependency Theory: Control over Resources 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 1972) is also concerned with control over 
resources, although it focuses on the effect of power on contracts, rather than on self-
interests and contracting costs.  RDT posits that power/dependence bases are influenced 
by the allocation of resources, which determines the structure of relationships (Emerson 
1962; Hatch 1997; Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer 1987; Pfeffer and Leong 1977; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978).  According to resource dependency theory, firms seek control over those 
resources on which they are highly dependent (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978).  Organizations can acquire control over resources completely via vertical 
integration (Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer 1987) or partially via long-term contracts, i.e., quasi-
integration (Pfeffer and Leong 1977).  RDT, therefore, studies the emergence of resource 
control as a way to control resources and reduce external dependency. 
2.1.1.3 Transaction Cost Economics: From Markets to Hierarchies 
Other theories also study the control over external resources via vertical 
integration or quasi-integration, but focus on idiosyncratic investments and coordination 
of activities (Williamson 1979; Williamson 1981). TCE is one of these theories.  
According to TCE, the flow of materials or services in the value chain is coordinated via 
two basic mechanisms: markets or hierarchies (Malone et al. 1987).  Markets use market 
forces such as supply and demand and price to coordinate flow of materials or services 
(Malone et al. 1987).  Alternatively, hierarchies use command chains to coordinate the 
flow of materials or services; managerial decisions determine the product or service 
characteristics, the price and the delivery conditions (Malone et al. 1987).  TCE uses the 
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characteristics of transactions (uncertainty, frequency and required asset specificity) as 
predictors of the chosen form of governance, that is, market mechanisms or firm 
hierarchical controls (Williamson 1998).  Further theoretical advances extended the 
theoretical principles to the study of interfirm relationships to include long-term 
relational contracts, joint ventures, quasi-firms, and quasi-integration (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman 1994), which Williamson had introduced as hybrid forms of integration 
(Williamson 1985).  These studies characterize interfirm relationships as taking place on 
the opposite poles of market versus quasi-integration. 
Rather than defining interfirm relationships in terms of these polar extremes, we 
follow the more modern approach of integration as a continuum of relationalism, which 
ranges between markets and hierarchies (Ganesan 1994; Macneil 1980).  While the 
market end is usually referred to as market, the hierarchy end had been termed either firm 
(Coase 1937), hierarchy (Williamson 1979; Williamson 1981), or relational exchange 
(Dwyer et al. 1987; Ganesan 1994; Macneil 1980).  Relationalism is measured by the 
level of investment in transaction-specific assets and the existence of market safeguards.  
Transaction specific assets are assets specialized to the particular needs of the 
relationship (Malone et al. 1987).  Safeguards are added supports into the contract, such 
as incentives and penalties or information disclosure (Williamson 1998).  Together, these 
two elements denote a closer relationship between the partnering organizations, which 
might involve mutual adaptation of assets and processes. 
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2.1.1.4 Relational View: Synergy 
Similarly to TCE, RV proposes that “a firm’s critical resources may span firm 
boundaries and may be embedded in interfirm routines and processes.” (Dyer and Singh 
1988 p.  661)  As such, partner organizations may generate competitive advantages 
“through the synergistic combination of assets, knowledge or capabilities.” (Dyer and 
Singh 1988 p.  661)  Organizations may accrue these advantages if they move their 
alliance away from a market-type relationship (Dyer and Singh 1988).  The distance to 
the market may be defined in terms of four attributes: (1) relation-specific assets, (2) 
knowledge sharing routines, (3) complementary resources and capabilities, and (4) 
governance mechanisms (Dyer and Singh 1988).  While Dyer and Singh don not specify 
such continuum from markets to quasi-hierarchies, their conceptualization of moving 
away from markets (Dyer and Singh 1988) may be interpreted as such.   
2.1.1.5 Relational Exchange Theory: Relational Norms 
RET is based in a similar market-hierarchy continuum.  The strength of relational 
norms positions the relationship along a discrete transaction - relational exchange 
continuum  (Dwyer et al. 1987).  Norms can serve as a governance mechanism by 
proscribing deviant behavior (Heide and John 1992).  In general, norms are defined as “a 
belief shared to some extent by members of a social unit as to what conduct ought to be 
in particular situations or circumstances.” (Gibbs 1981 p. 7)  A number of relational 
norms have been identified in the literature, including: solidarity, mutuality, role integrity 
(Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Macneil 1980), flexibility, and information sharing (Heide 
and John 1992).  Therefore, RET argues that the economic exchange can be defined 
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along a continuum defined by norms, as opposed to ownership and contracts in TCE or 
synergies in RV.   
TCE, RV and RET conceptualize the governance mechanisms that regulate the 
relationship in terms of how the relationship is different from a market.  These 
mechanisms, they argue, emerge in response to uncertainty, opportunism risks, and the 
idiosyncratic savings and synergies that may accrue from the relationship.  The final 
theory we discuss, the information processing view, takes a different line of attack, 
particularly with regard to uncertainty. 
2.1.1.6 Information Processing View: Coordination through Communication 
The information processing view of the firm posits that intra- and inter-firm 
structures emerge in response to the information processing needs of the organization(s) 
(Galbraith 1973).  Greater task uncertainty requires that greater amounts of information 
be processed (Galbraith 1973).  Firms utilize four different mechanisms to deal with 
uncertainties: (1) creation of slack resources, (2) creation of self-contained tasks, (3) 
investment in vertical integration systems, and (4) creation of lateral relationships.  Of 
these, creation of slack resources and self-contained tasks are substitutes for intra- or 
inter-organizational integration.  Investment in vertical information systems and creation 
of lateral resources, on the other hand, integrate organizations by increasing information 
sharing and communications.  In summary, firms create information processing 
mechanisms to increase interfirm coordination.   
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2.1.1.7 Summary and synthesis of the components of electronic integration 
The literature identifies two main general goals for integration, namely control 
and coordination, as exemplified in the following quote: 
“But in lieu of cost considerations or legal contracts, effective control and coordination 
were achieved, and opportunism avoided, through the regulatory presence of moral 
obligations, trust, and concern for preserving reputations.” (Larson 1992 p. 84) 
This distinction is pervasive in research on interfirm relationships.  While some 
studies focus on both goals (implicitly or explicitly), most focus on either of them.  
Agency theory, resource dependency theory and transaction cost economics based 
research focuses mostly on the control aspects of the relationship.  These theories suggest 
that relationship elements are “primarily aimed at curbing opportunistic behavior and 
establishing control over partner organizations” (Vlaar et al. 2007 p. 411).  Information 
processing view of the firm based research, on the other hand, posits that coordination 
costs form the basis for the design of relationship elements (Gulati and Singh 1998).  
Relational based view and relational exchange theory are used to study both control and 
coordination needs as predictors to the structure of relationships.  As a result, interfirm 
relationships are characterized by elements designed to increase coordination and 
increase control.   
As indicated earlier, integration relates to the existence of elements of the 
relationship that distinguish it from a market, and we classify these elements as 
coordination-oriented and control-oriented.  Two categories have been identified in the 
literature for coordination-oriented elements: investments in relational assets and process 
integration (i.e., capital vs. process integration).  Control-oriented elements are classified 
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into two groups as well: formal and relational contracts (i.e., formal vs. informal).  Each 
of these dimensions is presented below. 
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Figure 2. Process of Synthesis: from Theories to Dimensions 
 
2.1.2 Relational Dimensions 
2.1.2.1 Relation-specific assets 
Relation-specific assets are idiosyncratic investments in the relationship that are 
not easily re-deployable or have no salvage value if the firm were to end the relationship 
(Ganesan 1994; Williamson 1981).  Williamson identifies six different types of asset 
specificity: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset specificity, (3) human asset specificity, 
(4) brand names, (5) dedicated assets, and (6) temporal specificity (Williamson 1979; 
Williamson 1981; Williamson 1998).  Later research in IT in supply chains that applies 
TCE posits that intangible asset specificity forms the basis for contracting (Dyer and 
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Singh 1988; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  Some of that research conceptualizes 
intangible asset specificity as human (or human-capital) asset specificity, while newer 
conceptualizations focus on process and expertise (or domain knowledge) specificity 
(Subramani 2004; Subramani 1999; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).   
These are relevant because the firm “invests resources (time and money) to exploit the 
system functionality to derive specific business competencies from IOS through lower 
cost of information-exchange, faster response to inquiries and improved service.1” 
(Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994 p. 553)  This is consistent with Anderson and Weitz’s 
(1992) and Ganesan’s (1994) conceptualization of asset specificity.  Overall, asset 
specificity relates to investments in links to the partnering organization.  From the above 
mentioned components for process specificity, software and applications is left as assets, 
while procedures are considered a separate component: interfirm coordination processes. 
2.1.2.2 Inter-firm coordination processes 
Robicheaux and Coleman (1994) conceptualize (operational) integration in terms 
of the operational actions of the parties.  In their study of marketing channels, they use 
four inter-firm processes as indicants of the level of integration: joint actions, assistances, 
monitoring, and information exchange.  Alternatively, Bello et al. (2002) define 
operational integration through ICTs (a more generic approach) in terms of three process 
characteristics: (1) formalization, (2) task and resource centralization, and (3) 
standardization.  In the study of IT in supply chains, operational integration has included 
                                                 
1 Italics in original 
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administrative and operational procedures (Subramani 2004; Subramani 1999; Subramani 
and Venkatraman 2003) or information, physical and financial flow integration (Rai et al. 
2006).  We use the latter in the conceptualization of process integration. 
Physical flow integration refers to “the degree to which a focal firm uses global 
optimization with its supply chain partners to manage the stocking and flow of materials 
and finished goods” (Rai et al. 2006 p. 229).  Information flow integration refers to “the 
extent of operational, tactical, and strategic information sharing that occurs between a 
focal firm and its supply chain partners” (Rai et al. 2006 p. 229).  Finally, financial flow 
integration refers to “the degree to which financial flows between a focal firm and its 
supply chain partners is driven by workflow events” (Rai et al. 2006 p. 229).  Interfirm 
process integration as defined above is relevant because it comprises the different process 
components involved in the relationship.  Operational integration, via asset and process 
specificity, is complemented with formal and informal governance mechanisms that 
regulate the behaviors.   
2.1.2.3 Relational Norms 
Relational norms are informal governance mechanisms; monitoring, incentives 
and rewards are formal governance mechanisms.  These governance mechanisms are, 
purposely or not, aimed at establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational 
exchanges (Heide and John 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Social (relational) norms 
specify permissible limits on behavior, and thus serve as a protective governance 
mechanism that safeguard against opportunistic use of decision rights (Heide and John 
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1992).  Heide and John (1992) identify three relevant “dimensions” of relational norms: 
flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity.   
Flexibility represents the expectation that both parties will adapt in good-faith to 
changing circumstances (Heide and John 1992).  Information exchange represents the 
expectation that both parties will proactively share information useful to the other partner 
(Heide and John 1992).  Finally, solidarity represents the expectation that both parties 
value highly the relationship and will make efforts to maintain it (Heide and John 1992).  
These relational norms, i.e., informal mechanisms, are complemented by risk-sharing and 
monitoring, i.e., formal mechanisms.   
2.1.2.4 Agency Mechanisms. 
Risk sharing via incentives and rewards is an intrinsic element of agency theory.  
When organizations are interested in building and maintaining long-term relationships, 
they are willing to absorb or share part of the risks (Camuffo et al. 2005).  Camuffo et al. 
(2005) identify two main sources of risk in supply chain activities: “the risk arising from 
unpredictable fluctuations of demand and the risk arising from variations in prices/costs.” 
(Camuffo et al. 2005 p. 6)  Incentives are enacted in order to minimize and/or share risks.  
Incentives come in two forms: pecuniary incentives are incentives or penalties in 
monetary form (such as increase sale price), and non-pecuniary incentives are incentives 
or penalties in non-monetary form (such as promises or blocks on future contracts) 
(Moldoveanu and Martin 2001).   
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Monitoring mechanisms complement incentives by both providing performance 
measures to which the incentives are tied and an enforcement function more typical of 
hierarchies (Aulakh et al. 1996).  The literature identifies two basic types of monitoring 
mechanisms: output and process controls (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Aulakh et al. 1996; 
Eisenhardt 1985; Oliver and Anderson 1994).  Output and process controls are different 
in that they are generally associated, respectively, with different economic and behavioral 
outcomes (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Aulakh et al. 1996).  Output controls focus on 
assessments of the actual traded goods or services.  Process controls, on the other hand, 
focus on monitoring of the ongoing activities of the partners.  In summary, electronic 
integration is characterized by four main formative attributes: relation specific assets, 
interfirm coordination processes, relational norms, and agency control mechanisms; the 
following section describes the concept of embeddedness and its predictive effect on 
electronic integration.   
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Table 2. Synthesis of theories and dimensions of electronic integration 
Theory Relation-Specific 
Assets 
Interfirm  
Coordination 
Processes 
Relational 
Norms 
Agency  
Mechanisms 
Agency Theory (AT)    
Incentives 
Monitoring 
Resource Dependency  
Theory (RDT) Ownership and/or Control    
Transaction Cost  
Economics (TCE) Asset specificity Process specificity  Monitoring 
Relational Based  
View (RV) 
Relation-specific assets 
Complementary resources 
and capabilities 
Knowledge sharing 
routines  Governance mechanisms 
Relational Exchange  
Theory (RET)   
Solidarity 
Mutuality 
Flexibility 
Role integrity 
Information exchange 
 
Information Processing  
View (InfoView) 
Vertical integration 
systems 
Slack resources (R) 
Vertical integration 
systems (information 
sharing) 
Lateral relationships 
Self-contained tasks (R) 
Lateral relationships 
(informal relationships)  
Digital-related 
components 
IOS and knowledge 
specific assets 
Information flow 
integration 
Information sharing 
norms Monitoring 
(R) Reverse: the more of these mechanisms are present, the more market-like is the relationship. 
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2.2 Embeddedness 
Similar to the structure of a building being adapted to its surroundings, e.g., the 
composition and strength of the soil, the weather, the accessibility to water and sewage, 
the existing electric and communication networks, the local edification code, etc., the 
structure of inter-organizational relationships is also adapted to their own setting, e.g., the 
composition and strength of its suppliers and customers, the uncertainty of the market and 
technology, the existing networks of relationships, cultural environments, etc.  Originally 
introduced by Polanyi (1957), the concept of embeddedness argues that the economy is 
immersed in and subject to its societal context.   
Contrary to contemporary conventional economic wisdom, Polanyi argues that the 
society determines economic behavior2 and that material gain is not the only incentive to 
participate in economic activity (Dalton 1965; Polanyi 1957; Wilk 1996).  Dalton posits 
that “the institutions [organizations] through which goods were produced and distributed 
in repetitive, structured fashion, were ‘embedded’ in – a subordinate part of – social 
institutions” and that those social institutions control economic activity (Dalton 1965 p. 
3).  He further states that economic exchanges and allocation of rights to natural 
resources are structured in response to the need for communities to assure the provision 
of items necessary for community life (Dalton 1965).  More contemporary studies 
                                                 
2  Some of the theories utilized in this proposal point out factors that influence economic behavior and 
institutions in general.  The economic behavior being considered is digital integration, the institutions 
being influenced are the firms involved in an economic exchange and the relationship between them.  
These terms, economic behavior, economic exchange and electronic integration, are used interchangeably 
throughout this document and refer to the latter. 
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address embeddedness as a complement to economic rationalities and posit that 
individual motivations are not the only stimulus for economic activity. 
Drawing on the tradition of economic anthropology, Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) 
posit that the social structure in which the economy is embedded may be defined in terms 
of four inter-related dimensions: cognitive, cultural, structural and political.  Figure 3 
conceptualizes the relationship between the organization and these four dimensions of the 
environment.  Each of these embeddedness patterns is hypothesized to affect the 
intentions and actions of organizations to digitally integrate with other organizations.  
Various researchers have worked on the concept of embeddedness (e.g., Gnyawali and 
Madhavan (2001), Granovetter (1985)).   
Political
StructuralCo
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Organization
 
Figure 3. The concept of embeddedness 
 
Due to the nature of each of these constructs, the present study only focuses on 
cognitive, cultural and political.  The study of structural embeddedness focuses on social 
structures and patterns of relationships.  This requires the study of social networks, which 
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is not consistent with the present study.  In this section, we describe the three types of 
embeddedness considered and their relation to integration. 
2.2.1 Cognitive Embeddedness 
“The ways in which the structured regularities of mental processes limit [or 
enable] the exercise of economic reasoning” (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990 p. 15) 
A cognitive turn in economics and sociology has put uncertainty in the spotlight 
in recent decades following the work of Simon, March and colleagues at Carnegie-
Mellon University (Dequech 2003).  This new school of thought posits that firms are 
limited in what they can predict about the future and that they adapt to cope with this 
limitation (Galbraith 1973; Simon 1957; Simon 1987; Simon 1991; Zukin and DiMaggio 
1990).  These cognitive limitations are said to be caused by uncertainty (Galbraith 1973; 
Simon 1957; Simon 1987).  Extant research on organizational and interorganizational 
structures and governance mechanisms identify uncertainty as a driving force for 
hierarchical control (Galbraith 1973; Gulati and Singh 1998; Williamson 1975; 
Williamson 1979; Williamson 1981; Williamson 1985).   
In the tradition of the information processing view of the firm, uncertainty is 
defined as “the difference between information possessed and information required to 
complete a task” (Tushman and Nader 1978 p. 615).  Alternatively, in the tradition of 
TCE, uncertainty is defined as an inability to predict the future due to lack of information 
(Milliken 1987).   
The perception of uncertainty is not the only element influencing decision making 
process and the willingness to collaborate electronically across borders. 
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2.2.2 Cultural Embeddedness 
“Culture, in the form of beliefs and ideologies, taken for granted assumptions, or 
formal rule systems, also prescribes strategies of self-interested action and 
defines the actors who may legitimately engage in them” (Zukin and DiMaggio 
1990 p. 15) 
Extant research suggests that culture, too, influences information technology 
adoption and transfer (Hermeking 2005; Hill et al. 1998; Klein et al. 2003; La Ferle et al. 
2002; Straub et al. 1997; Straub et al. 2001) and international economic exchanges (Dyer 
et al. 1998; Griffith and Myers 2005).  Some researchers point to national culture as a 
subtle, less tangible and complex factor (Ford et al. 2003).  Although there are many 
definitions of culture, most agree in that culture is a set of social characteristics shared by 
a group of people and that these characteristics act as mental programs, predisposing 
people’s behaviors in certain circumstances (Hofstede 1980). There are different ways to 
approach the study of culture, ranging from the qualitative information-rich and time-
intensive ethnographies, to the quantitative, leaner positivist methodologies.   
Among the quantitative methodologies, Hofstede’s framework of cultural 
dimensions (Hofstede 1980) is probably the most widely recognized.  A wealth of studies 
use Hofstede’s framework (either completely or in part) as a predictor of organizational 
behavior.  Ford states that between 1980 (the original publication date) and 1999, 
Hofstede’s work “ had been cited nearly 1700 times in the Social Science Citation Index 
(SSCI).” (Ford et al. 2003 p. 9).  Hofstede proposed that the culture of employees in 
different countries varies along four dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity/femininity, and individualism/collectivism (Hofstede 1980).  In a subsequent 
study, Bond (1987) identified a fifth dimension: Confucianism or future orientation, 
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which Hofstede (1988) then added to his framework.  The five dimensions included in 
Hofstede’s final framework are: 
• Uncertainty avoidance (UAI): relates to the level of comfort that individuals 
feel in the face of uncertain or unknown situations. 
• Power distance (PDI): relates to relationship of the individuals to their 
superiors and subordinates and provides an indication of the degree to which 
people accepts vertical forms of power and participation in the decision 
making process. 
• Individualism vs. Collectivism (I/C): relates to the relationship of individuals 
to their fellows (be it family, work or other collective) and provides an 
indication of the degree to which individuals in a group act in the best 
interests of the group or their own. 
• Masculinity vs. Femeninity (M/F): relates to the degree of competitiveness and 
assertiveness of the people and their concerns for others and quality of life. 
• Confucian Dynamism or long-term orientation (LTO): relates to future- versus 
past- and present-oriented values and compares how people regard 
perseverance and thrift (high LTO), versus respect for tradition and fulfilling 
social obligations (low LTO) (Ford et al. 2003). 
 
 
While this framework is probably the best known and most widely used, it is by 
no means the only framework, nor does it lack in controversy.  Hofstede’s framework 
“has been criticized for: reducing culture to an overly simplistic four or five dimension 
conceptualization; limiting the sample to a single multinational corporation; failing to 
capture the malleability of culture over time; and ignoring within-country cultural 
heterogeneity” (Kirkman (2006 p. 286) citing Sivakumar and Nakata (2001)) .  Even 
though these criticisms have merit, the framework is still valid on an ecological level 
when applied to the national and regional level (Ford et al. 2003).   
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2.2.2.1 Alternative frameworks 
At the same time, other frameworks exist that assess the cultural traits of 
populations in quantitative form.  The GLOBE Project, for example, defines culture in 
terms of nine different dimensions: (1)performance orientation, (2)uncertainty avoidance, 
(3)humane orientation, (4)institutional collectivism, (5)in-group collectivism, 
(6)assertiveness, (7)gender egalitarianism, (8)future orientation, (9)power distance 
(House et al. 2004).  This study elaborates on Hofstede’s work.  It includes all five of 
Hofstede’s dimensions and expands on his work in two ways: by adding more 
dimensions (some of which are derived from Hofstede’s) and by conceptualizing each 
dimension in two different ways: practices and values (House et al. 2004). 
We chose to utilize Hofstede’s dimensions for two reasons: some of GLOBE’s 
dimensions are difficult to interpret and it has not been as widely validated as Hofstede 
(Wennekers et al. 2007).  Also, of Hofstede’s dimensions, we use only Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  This dimension is the most relevant of the four to the study of information 
exchange given the effect of information on reducing uncertainty. 
2.2.3 Political Embeddedness 
“The manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a 
struggle for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions” 
(Zukin and DiMaggio 1990 p. 20) 
Power has been recognized as a significant influence in economic activity.  
Organizational action is influenced by external organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983).  This is true of interorganizational relationships and the adoption of 
interorganizational systems and technologies (Chwelos et al. 2001; Teo et al. 2003).  The 
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degree of influence, i.e., enacted power (Chwelos et al. 2001), on the decision to integrate 
electronically, will depend on a: (1) the relative power of the parties, and (2) the stimuli 
to integrate. 
Some researchers point out that power is a complex concept, difficult to grasp, 
messy and elusive (Jasperson et al. 2002).  Hall (1999) defines power as having “to do 
with relationships between two or more actors in which the behavior of one is affected by 
the behavior of the other” (Hall 1999 p. 100).  As such, power is commonly 
conceptualized as ability to influence.  In this sense, the term reflects a broad spectrum of 
power bases, e.g., information, expertise, and control over resources.  Yet, the use of 
power will be a function not only of the amount of power yielded by the partners, but also 
of the stimuli to use it. 
The interest or stimuli of a firm on engaging in electronic integration stems from 
the recognition of an internal need within the organizations (Chwelos et al. 2001; 
Premkumar 1995).  Recognizing the potential benefits of electronic integration is a first 
step towards the intent to integrate.  Interestingly, no studies to date investigated the 
interaction between power and interest; existing studies evaluate their effects additively, 
rather than interactively.  As such, in the present study, potential influence, as a measure 
of power, is regarded as a combination of interest and power.   
In summary, political embeddedness will comprise the interaction between power 
and interest.  In the next section we describe the research model and formalize the 
relationship between embeddedness and electronic integration. 
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Chapter 3 Research Model 
Next we present a model that offers a deeper understanding of electronic 
integration by dissecting it into four dimensions and examining the effects of uncertainty, 
culture and power on digital integration.  First, we derive the digital dimensions of 
electronic integration (Figure 4).  We do this by investigating which informational 
components are present in each of the dimensions presented above.  Second, we theorize 
the effects of each of the environmental dimensions considered (i.e., uncertainty, culture 
and power) on the degree of digital integration.  Some of these predictors are theorized to 
have a direct effect on digital integration, while others are theorized to have moderated 
effects (Figure 5 and Table 3).   
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3.1 Digital Integration 
Overall, the aforementioned perspectives (AT, RDT, TCE, RET, RV, and 
InfoView) define integration in terms of the governance and coordination structures of 
the exchange.  As noted in the prior discussion, integration in the literature has been 
conceptualized in narrow terms that are specific to each theory or in a broad sense as 
ownership or proportion of business related to a particular partner.  Considering the 
increasingly important role of ICTs in economic activity, Malone et al. (1987) extend the 
framework of integration to a continuum of electronic markets – electronic hierarchies.  
Venkatraman et al. give the name of electronic integration to this continuum (Bensaou 
and Venkatraman 1995; Venkatraman 1991; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).   
Zaheer and Venkatraman define electronic integration as “a specific form of 
vertical quasi-integration achieved through the deployment of dedicated information 
systems between relevant actors in adjacent stages of the value-chain” (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman 1994 p. 551).  As such, the above conceptualizations of integration and 
quasi-integration apply to electronic integration.  In this work, we distinguish between 
electronic integration and digital integration (DI).  While electronic integration refers to 
quasi-integration enabled by information technologies, we define digital integration as 
the degree or presence in a vertical relationship of hierarchy-like mechanisms that 
are informational in nature. 
In that sense, the dimensions considered above are limited to the processes and 
systems that pertain to the exchange of information (Figure 4): 
• Asset specificity: information related assets include dedicated inter-
organizational systems (IOS) as well as knowledge unique to the 
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relationship.  IOS are conceptualized in terms of software and applications 
(e.g., billing, inventory management) and administrative and operational 
procedures (e.g., vendor selection, bar-coding) unique to the relationship 
(Subramani 2004; Subramani 1999; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  
Knowledge specificity is conceptualized as knowledge and understanding 
of processes that is unique to the relationship.   
• Inter-firm processes: we consider only information flow integration.  As 
stated before, information flow integration refers to “the extent of 
operational, tactical, and strategic information sharing that occurs between 
a focal firm and its supply chain partners” (Rai et al. 2006 p. 229).   
• Social/relational norms: of the various norms that have been studied, 
information exchange is the most relevant to our study.  Information 
exchange norms refer to the expectation that both parties will proactively 
share information useful to the other partner (Heide and John 1992).   
• Agency mechanisms: while incentives are an important agency 
mechanism, they are not in itself an informational element.  Monitoring, 
on the other hand, is an informational element consistent with our 
conceptualization of digital integration. 
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Figure 4. Components/dimensions of digital integration 
 
In addition to deepening our understanding of digital integration, we investigate 
its predictors. 
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3.2 Predictors of Digital Integration 
There is ample evidence that uncertainty affects the structure of organizations and 
relationships (e.g., Heide and John (1992), Ganesan, (1994) and Choudhury (1997)).  
Interestingly, the research is not always consistent.  We explain the inconsistencies by 
adding a moderating variable (coordination benefits vs. opportunism risks).  Research 
that investigates the effect of culture on digital integration also presents conflicting 
results.  In this case we adopt the propositions presented by studies from the international 
business field, since the settings in which they are conducted are better aligned with ours.  
Finally, power has been predicted to influence integration.  We further extend this 
research by dissecting enacted power into power and stimuli.  Figure 5 summarizes the 
model and Table 3 presents an advance on the hypotheses. 
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Figure 5. Research model 
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Table 3. Hypotheses 
Determinants Effect Hypothesis Selected 
References 
Uncertainty Direct H1a: Perceived environmental uncertainty is 
positively related to digital integration 
Heide and John 
(1992), 
Choudhury (1997)
? Coordination 
needs 
Moderator H1b: The relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and digital 
integration is moderated by the intensity of 
coordination needs. 
Dekker (2004) 
? Opportunism Moderator H1c: The relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and digital 
integration is moderated by the intensity of 
opportunism risks. 
Dekker (2004) 
Coordination 
needs 
Direct H1d: Coordination needs is positively related to 
digital integration. 
Dekker (2004) 
Opportunism Direct H1e: Opportunism is negatively related to digital 
integration. 
Dekker (2004) 
Culture (UAI) Direct H2: Higher levels of national uncertainty 
avoidance are related to higher levels of 
digital integration 
Dyer et al., 
(1998,) 
IT 
sophistication 
Direct H3a: Higher levels of IT sophistication are related 
to higher levels of digital integration.   
Chwelos et al. 
(2001) 
? Ability to 
Influence 
Moderator H3b: The impact of IT sophistication on digital 
integration is moderated by the ability to 
influence of the focus partner. 
Mohr et al., 
(1996) 
Chatterjee (2002) 
Ability to 
Influence 
Direct H3c: Ability to influence is related to digital 
integration. 
Mohr et al., 
(1996) 
Chatterjee (2002) 
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3.3 Uncertainty  
While some studies agree in that organizations choose tighter, i.e., more 
integrated, forms of governance in conditions of high uncertainty, others find opposite 
effects.  Some previous research suggests that uncertainty increases the level of joint 
action (Heide and John 1990) and the adoption of inter-organizational information 
systems (Choudhury 1997).  Alternatively, Ganesan (1994) finds a negative relationship 
between environmental diversity, a proxy for uncertainty, and long-term orientation, a 
proxy for integration.  Bello and Gilliland (1997) also posit that, in international contexts 
where uncertainty opens the door to opportunistic behavior, increased uncertainty would 
warrant lower levels of commitment.  Dekker (2004) identifies a trade-off between two 
control problems that might explain these contradicting results: the coordination of tasks 
and the management of appropriation concerns (or opportunism risks).   
3.3.1 Moderated Effects 
Overall, studies find that when organizations perceive the need to increase 
coordination, they feel motivated to collaborate (i.e., share information), and when they 
perceive opportunism risks that would derive from sharing information, organizations 
feel motivated to either vertically integrate or maintain arms-length relationships, but not 
to engage in collaborative relationships (Atallah 2003; Baiman and Rajan 2002; Kumar 
and van Diesel 1996; Williamson 1985).  Coordination needs arise as a result of 
interdependencies (Galbraith 1973; Galbraith 1977; Gulati and Singh 1998; Kumar and 
van Diesel 1996).  Opportunism risks, on the other hand, are related to opportunistic use 
of decision rights by the partners.  These control issues are hypothesized to moderate the 
effect of uncertainty on integration and thus, hopefully, resolve the seeming contradiction 
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between the points of view in this literature.  We also examine their direct effects as 
reported in previous research. 
The following hypotheses will thus be examined: 
H1a: Perceived environmental uncertainty is positively related to digital 
integration 
H1b: The relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and digital 
integration is moderated by the intensity of coordination needs. 
H1c: The relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and digital 
integration is moderated by the intensity of opportunism risks.  
H1d: Coordination needs is positively related to digital integration. 
H1e: Opportunism is negatively related to digital integration. 
 
Integration affects coordination needs and opportunism risks because information, 
sometimes strategic, is shared between the partners.  The value and role of information, 
however, is culturally sensitive, and therefore will also be influenced by cultural 
characteristics (Griffith and Myers 2005).  The next section addresses the impact of 
culture on the relationship.   
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3.4 Culture (Uncertainty Avoidance) 
Two areas of application of culture are relevant to the proposed study: (1) 
international relational exchanges, and (2) innovation in general and adoption of ICTs in 
particular.  The literature on international relational exchanges suggests that culture might 
explain differences in supplier relationships (Dyer et al. 1998; Griffith and Myers 2005; 
Shore 2001).  Cultures high in individualism, low in power distance, low in uncertainty 
avoidance and with a short-term orientation would prefer an arms-length-type of 
contracting, while cultures with the opposite characteristics would prefer a partnership-
type of relationship (Dyer et al. 1998; Shore 2001).  Arms-length relationships are 
characterized as short term contracts, with frequent re-bidding, low levels of information 
sharing, low levels of relation-specific investments, and low levels of trust (Dyer et al. 
1998; Shore 2001).  Partnership-type exchanges, on the other hand, are defined as long-
term contracts, less frequent re-bidding, high levels of information sharing, high levels of 
relation-specific investments, and high levels of trust (Dyer et al. 1998; Shore 2001).  
This classification of exchanges is consistent with the market-hierarchy continuum shown 
earlier.  These studies, however, are particular to the area of integration and leadership, 
and ignore the adoption of technologies, which are involved in electronic integration. 
Studies on innovation in general and adoption of ICTs in particular found 
different effects of Hofstede’s dimensions on innovation and adoption of ICTs.  Many of 
these studies focused on uncertainty avoidance (UA), which was negatively correlated 
with innovativeness in general (Steenkamp et al. 1999) and with the adoption of the 
Internet (Mooij 1998; Mooij 2000; Mooij 2004) or ICT products (Yeniyurt and 
Townsend 2003).  This effect was moderated (weakened) by literacy and international 
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trade.  LaFerle et al. (2002) extended the analysis to all four dimensions and found that 
three of the four original dimensions were significantly correlated to internet adoption 
while the masculine/feminine dimension presented inconclusive results.  In the same 
study, LaFerle et al. (2002) found that the effect of M/F in Internet adoption is significant 
after controlling for I/C.  Although significant, the adoption of these technologies did not 
seem to conflict with cultural norms and values such as information exchange and the 
value of information in the studies mentioned.   
In the present context, cultural norms that relate to information sharing between 
organizations, power structures, and cooperation do conflict with the adoption of 
technologies that mediate the relationship.  Therefore, we propose that the impact of 
relation-oriented cultural norms is stronger than cultural acceptance of technology.  Due 
to the constraints of the study, only uncertainty avoidance is included in the present 
study.   
The following hypothesis will be tested:   
H2: Higher levels of national uncertainty avoidance are related to higher 
levels of digital integration 
 
The selection of a cultural dimension was split between uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance.  These are the two dimensions that present the most conflict with regards 
to sharing information.  Uncertainty avoidance interacts highly with the need to share 
information to reduce uncertainty.  Power distance, at the same time, relates to issues of 
equality and the perception of information as power.  While they both seem relevant, UAI 
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seemed more appropriate in the present context.  However, power itself is relevant to the 
study and was included separately. 
3.5 Power and Stimuli 
Power is commonly conceptualized as ability to influence.   The degree of 
influence, i.e., enacted power (Chwelos et al. 2001), on the decision to integrate digitally, 
will depend on: (1) the relative power of the parties (ability to influence), and (2) the 
stimuli to integrate.  The relative power of the parties is represented by the dependence 
on the partner and the degree of influence (a direct measure of power) (Chatterjee 2002; 
Mohr et al. 1996).  Decisions to integrate or not would be influenced by the power to 
integrate as well as the willingness to do so.  The degree of IT sophistication is a driver of 
willingness and ability to engage in digital integration (Chwelos et al. 2001; Iacovou 
1995; Pare and Raymond 1991; Raymond and Pare 1992).  They contend that 
“sophisticated firms usually are less likely to feel intimidated by the technology, possess 
a superior corporate view of data as an integral part of overall information management, 
and have access to the required technological resources” (Iacovou 1995 p. 469).  Based 
on this line of thought, the following hypotheses emerge: 
 
H3a: Higher levels of IT sophistication are related to higher levels of digital 
integration.   
H3b: The impact of IT sophistication on digital integration is moderated by the 
power of the focus partner.  
H3b: The impact of IT sophistication on digital integration is moderated by the 
power of the focus partner.  
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H3c: Ability to influence is related to digital integration. 
 
3.6 Control constructs 
For the proposed study, we also consider constructs typically included in research 
in international business, B2B marketing, supply chain, and inter-organizational 
information systems research.  These constructs are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Control constructs used in inter-organizational research 
Construct Hypothesized effect 
Firm Size Positive It is expected that larger firms have increased levels of 
digital integration. 
Customer 
Firm Size 
Positive It is expected that larger firms have increased levels of 
digital integration. 
Technological 
Culturation 
Positive It is expected that higher levels of technological culturation 
leads to more comfort with information technologies and 
digital integration. 
 
One construct regularly included in B2B research and not included in the present 
research is trust.  The reason for this is the interactions that we may expect between trust 
and opportunism, power and culture.  The following section presents the research design 
and data collection. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design 
We chose to use a field study methodology using an online questionnaire and 
archival data.  The survey asks subjects to choose a significant foreign partner and 
respond to all questions to the best of their ability.  Secondary data was gathered to assess 
macro-level measures (culture).  A pilot test was performed on the instrument to evaluate 
and refine the measures.  This section describes the process and outcome of the research 
design. 
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4.1 Research Context 
This research is about B2B in an international context.  As such, the model 
requires that the study be conducted among organizations with international customers or 
suppliers.   For reasons laid out below, we chose to utilize a panel with participants in the 
U.S., the U.K. and Germany.    
4.1.1 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is the relationship.  A relationship is a business link between 
two organizations (Figure 6).  We chose one participant per relationship and asked her 
questions intrinsic to a B2B relationship.  We do this by asking the respondent to select 
their most critical foreign customer and answer questions using this party as a reference 
point.  Therefore, only participants involved in sales to international customers were 
selected for this study.  The rationale to utilize salespeople is twofold: on one hand, 
methodological, on the other hand, practical.   
Customer
Vendor
Supplier
Relationship
Selected Key
Respondent
Country A         Country B
 
Figure 6. Rich-picture of international B2B relationships 
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4.1.2 Customers or Suppliers 
Methodologically, there is no reason why the vendor/supplier side is better than 
the customer side for gathering data.  Both sales and procurement people have equal 
understanding of the relationship; they just sit on opposite sides of the table.  At the same 
time, selecting both (from different relationships) would add an extra level of analysis 
that exceeds the scope of the present study.  Finally, an optimal option would have been 
to obtain dyadic data, that is, from both sides of the same relationship, but this option 
presented practical constraints. 
The practical reasons for the selection relate to the configuration of the panel.  
While some participants in the panel were involved in procurement, the numbers were 
borderline enough to achieve the required sample size and presented significant risks 
(Table 5).  As evident from Table 5, we would need a response rate of 25% to reach a 
sample size of 55 procurement people in Germany.  Thus, a sufficient number of dyads 
was not available from the panel. 
Table 5. Available subjects in panel 
Country
Function 
U.S.* U.K. Germany 
Procurement N/A 1,275 220 
Sales / Business 
Development 
N/A 8,578 990 
* Data not available for U.S.  This is not a problem because there 
are considerably more members in the U.S. than U.K. or Germany 
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4.1.3 Selection of Countries 
The second decision was the selection of countries.  As noted above, we chose to 
utilize a panel with participants in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany.  Again, the rationale 
for the selection of countries is both methodological and practical.  Methodologically, we 
look for countries that differ on the dimension of choice (UAI) but are similar in all other 
dimensions.  As such, we chose three western countries with greater variance on UAI.  
Choosing western countries help achieve similarity within non-UAI dimensions.  Then 
we need to select countries that differ in UAI.  Ideally, those countries would have been 
the Netherlands or Denmark (low UAI), Portugal or Greece (high UAI), and the U.S. 
(average UAI); although this selection would present high variability on other dimensions 
as well, which is not desirable (Table 6). 
Table 6. Selected countries and cultural values (www.geert-hofstede.com) 
Country PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO 
Denmark 18 74 16 23 n/a 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 44 
United States 40 91 62 46 29 
Greece 60 35 57 112 n/a 
Portugal 63 27 31 104 n/a 
Germany 35 67 66 65 31 
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 25 
 
This selection, also presented practical challenges.  There were insufficient 
members in the panel from these countries.  The final selection represents a compromise 
between availability (as indicated in Table 5) and cultural variance (Table 6).  Germany, 
the U.S., and the U.K. present medium, medium low and low values of UAI, respectively, 
but at the same time also present more homogeneity on other cultural dimensions (Table 
6).  The following sections describe the development of the instrumentation, the final 
instrumentation and measures and the data collection. 
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4.2 Measures 
The instrumentation was developed in four stages: (1) a review of the theory 
informed the major constructs and existing measures were reused or adapted, (2) a draft 
version of the instrumentation was developed, (3) a pilot test was conducted and (4) the 
instrumentation was adapted as necessary.  Whenever possible, existing measures were 
used.  Some were taken as is, while others were adapted to the current context.  New 
measures were also created from the original construct definitions.  Some of the 
constructs defined in the present study are reflective, while others are formative (Table 
7).   
4.2.1 Digital Integration 
Digital Integration (DI) is a second order formative construct.  It is a second 
order construct based on the fact that we do not measure DI directly, but it is rather a 
combination of its dimensions, namely (1) inter-organizational systems and knowledge 
specificity (IOS&K), (2) information flow integration (IFI), (3) monitoring (AG), and (4) 
expectation of information exchange (ISN) (Table 8).  Each of these dimensions is a first-
order construct.  DI is a formative second-order construct because “the items describe 
and define the construct rather than vice versa” (Petter et al. 2007 p. 623).  More 
specifically, we model DI as a Type II second order construct where “the second order 
factor has first-order factors as formative indicators and the first-order factors themselves 
have reflective indicators” (Jarvis et al. 2003 p. 204).  We utilize a hierarchical 
component approach using repeated indicators.  In this case, the indicators of the first 
order construct are directly connected to the second order construct.  This method works 
best with equal number of indicators for the first order constructs (Chin et al. 1996).  For 
  
43
this reason, each first-order component was operationalized as having three indicators 
each.   
Table 7. Determination of each construct as reflective 
Construct Theory Predictor Dropping Change Causality F vs. R 
Digital Integration n/a ? ? ? ? Formative 
IOS&K Specificity ?* ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Information Flow 
Integration 
?# ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Monitoring ? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Information Exchange 
(norm) 
? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Perc. Environmental 
Uncertainty 
? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Coordination Needs ? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Opportunism risks ? ? ? ? ? Formative 
UAI (Espoused 
Values) 
? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
UAI (National Values) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Single-
item 
IT sophistication 
(benefits) 
? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
IT sophistication 
(management attitude) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Single-
item 
Ability to Influence 
(A?B) 
? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Ability to Influence 
(B?A) 
? ? ? ? ? Reflective 
Each column represents a response to each of the questions posited by Petter et al. (2007): 
1. Theory: Does the theory base typically view this as a formative construct?  
2. Predictor: “Do the indicators predict the construct?” (Petter et al. 2007 p. 642) 
3. Dropping: “Does dropping a measure change what the construct is measuring? “(Petter et al. 2007 p. 
642) 
4. Change: “Does a change in one measure of the construct not require a change in all other measures of 
the construct?” (Petter et al. 2007 p. 642) 
5. Causality : “Do the measures have different antecedents and consequences?” (Petter et al. 2007 p. 642) 
 
*  Subramany and Venkatraman (2003) define asset specificity as formative.  We argue that the items we 
selected may be conceptualized as reflective. 
#  Similarly, Rai et al. (2006) conceptualize information flow integration as formative.  We argue that 
given the nature of the construct and their results it may be modeled as reflective. 
 
 
 
  
44
Table 8. Measurement of digital integration 
Construct Items Reference Modified/ 
New 
Digital 
Integration 
[F; 2nd order] 
Items below are based on dimensions of: 
• Asset specificity 
• Information flows integration 
• Monitoring 
• Expectation of information exchange 
 New 
Software and applications (e.g., billing, ordering, 
inventory management, and EDI) are unique to 
our foreign customer. 
The knowledge needed for planning new 
products and programs is unique to our foreign 
customer 
IOS&K 
Specificity 
[R] 
The knowledge needed in product conception 
and design is unique to our foreign customer 
Subramani 
and 
Venkatraman 
(2003) 
Minor 
adaptation 
(two 
constructs 
merged) 
Nearly all delivery schedules are shared 
electronically with our foreign customer 
Nearly all performance metrics are shared 
electronically with our foreign customer 
Information 
Flows 
Integration 
[R] 
Inventory and/or service capacity data are 
electronically visible to our foreign customer 
Rai et al. 
(2006) 
Minor 
adaptation 
(two items 
dropped) 
Our firm regularly monitors the quality control 
maintained by our foreign customer 
Our firm frequently monitors the marketing 
activities performed by our foreign customer 
Monitoring 
[R] 
Our firm closely monitors the extent to which 
our foreign customer follows established 
procedures 
Aulakh et al. 
(1996) 
Minor 
adaptation 
(one item 
dropped) 
In this relationship, it is expected that nearly all 
information that might help our foreign customer 
will be provided to them 
It is expected that our firm and our foreign 
customer will readily provide proprietary 
information if it can help the other party 
Information 
exchange [R] 
It is expected that our firm and our foreign 
customer will keep each other informed about 
events or changes that may affect the other party. 
Heide and 
John (1992) 
Minor 
adaptation 
(one item 
dropped) 
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4.2.1.1 Inter-Organizational Systems and Knowledge Specificity 
We used three reflective indicators using a semantic-differential scale to measure 
IOS&K specificity.  The indicators were developed by Subramany and Venkatraman 
(2003).  All items inquire about the extent to which relationship-specific assets 
customized to that particular customer or not.  We measure specificity of software and 
applications used in the relationship and knowledge needed for planning and design 
products sold to the customer.  We conceptualize these items as one reflective construct.  
This represents a slight departure from Subramani and Venkatraman’s model. 
Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) conceptualized asset specificity as two inter-
correlated reflective constructs (business process specificity and domain knowledge 
specificity), each having three items.  Of the three items that composed business process 
specificity, only one (software and applications) is relevant to the present context (i.e., 
informational in nature).  We selected two items pertaining to domain knowledge 
specificity are relevant to the present context.  We aggregate all three items into one 
reflective construct (Tables 7, 8 & 9).   
Wording was adapted to shorten the item.  An example of the modification is 
shown below.  The original wording:  
“The extent to which the knowledge and understanding used in planning for new 
products, programs for RetCo is significantly specific to the relationship (i.e., 
customized for RetCo) or is relatively similar to what you use with other 
retailers” (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003). 
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was adapted to be: 
The knowledge needed for planning new products and programs is unique to our 
foreign customer. 
 
Finally, we use a seven-point semantic-differential scale to measure the items.  
We adapted the original anchors: we changed “retailers” for “customers and, for technical 
reasons3, we eliminated the middle points and only left the extremes: 
Relatively similar to other customers ↔ Customized for our foreign customer 
 
Table 9. Criteria for determination of IOS&K specificity as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) conceptualize specificity in terms of 
two second-order formative constructs (they actually measure them 
separately).  Alternatively, we select only three of their six indicators and 
contend that they are reflective.  We base our thinking on the assumption 
that the decision to invest in relationship-specific assets affects the 
different aspects measured equally.  Also, we assume that the specificity 
of the relationship affects all its components similarly. 
Predictor ? As indicated before, we posit that the construct predicts the items. 
Dropping ? We posit that, given the nature of the decision to invest in relationship-
specific assets, all items co-vary, and therefore, dropping one would not 
affect the overall measure. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as investment in 
relationship-specific assets precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that the antecedents of IOS&K specificity explain all its 
components equally well. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The survey application would allow only for little space for the anchors.  Given the wording of the items, 
we opted for the latter. 
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4.2.1.2 Information Flow Integration 
We use a three-item reflective measure to gauge information flow integration 
(IFI).  The measure was developed by Rai et al. (2006).  We measure IFI as information 
sharing about inventories, schedules, and performance4.  We model IFI as a reflective 
construct (Tables 7, 8 & 10). 
Table 10. Criteria for determination of information flow integration as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? All constructs measure information sharing.  In our context, it is 
reasonable to assume that the degree to which information is shared with 
partners varies from relationship to relationship equally.   
Predictor ? Based on our earlier point, we assume that there is an underlying element 
(construct) that predicts whether more or less information is shared in the 
relationship.  We expect relationships with greater IFI would have greater 
values across all indicators and vice versa.  This is exemplified in figure 
7.  We posit that while the different items might “engage” at different 
levels of integration, they are in fact a function of integration and not the 
other way around.  We propose that as the level of integration increases, 
the scores for all items increase.   
Dropping ? Given the high reliability values presented by Rai et al., we assert a priori 
that we will not lose information if we drop an item. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as information 
sharing precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that the antecedents of IFI explain all its components equally 
well.  Figure 8 exemplifies this argument.  According to our theoretical 
model, uncertainty affects all components of IFI.  For example, it is 
intuitive that in uncertain markets, organizations will be more open to 
share inventory information in order to increase efficiencies and prevent 
the whiplash effect.  But sharing delivery schedules is also important in 
high uncertain markets.  Less intuitive but equally important is the 
sharing of performance metrics.  Theory suggests that in uncertain 
situations organizations will seek strategic alliances in order to achieve 
competitive advantages. 
 
                                                 
4 We chose the three items that pertain to information flows (i.e., sharing), which also load heaviest on the 
latent construct.  We discarded the following items:  
• Supply chain members collaborate in arriving at demand forecasts  
• Our downstream partners (e.g., distributors, wholesalers, retailers) share their actual sales data 
with us 
Our focus is somewhat different from Rai et al’s in that we focus on information integration per se, while 
they also included collaboration measures.   
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Figure 7. Example of predictor attribute for the determination of a construct 
as formative or reflective 
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(a) Structural Model 
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Uncertainty
 
(b) Nomological Network 
Figure 8. Example of causality attribute for the determination of a construct 
as formative or reflective 
 
 
The adaptations are only meant to match the context better.  We used a seven-
point Likert scale to measure each item (Table 11). 
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Table 11. Seven-point Likert scale utilized in the survey 
Strongly 
agree Agree Slightly agree
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
4.2.1.3 Monitoring 
We measured monitoring using three reflective indicators developed by Aulakh et 
al. (1996).  We measure the extent to which a firm monitors the activities of the other, 
more specifically, quality control, marketing, and follows procedures.  We dropped one 
item for two reasons: (1) we need to narrow down the specification to three items, and (2) 
one item inquired about process specificity, which is not consistent with the 
conceptualization of the construct.  We conceptualize the items as reflective of the degree 
of monitoring across the relationship (Tables 7, 8 & 12).  We use seven-point Likert scale 
to measure the items. 
Table 12. Criteria for determination of monitoring as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? All constructs measure regular monitoring of customer’s activities.  In 
our context, it is reasonable to assume that the degree to which a firm 
monitors its partners varies from relationship to relationship similarly 
across all items.   
Predictor ? We assume that there is an underlying element (construct) that predicts 
whether a firm monitors its partners more or less.  We expect 
relationships with greater monitoring would have greater values across all 
indicators and vice versa.   
Dropping ? Given the high reliability values presented by Aulakh et al. (1996), we 
assert a priori that we will not lose information if we drop an item. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as the decision to 
monitor which precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that the antecedents of Monitoring explain all its components 
equally well. 
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4.2.1.4 Expectation of Information Exchange 
We measured information exchange using three reflective indicators developed by 
Heide and John (1992).  We measure the extent to which there is an expectation that 
information that would help the partner will be provided to them.  We measure whether 
there is an expectation to share information: (1) if it helps the firm’s customer, (2) if it 
can help the other party, and (3) if it helps keep each other informed of changes.  We 
dropped one item in order to narrow down the specification to three items in order to 
keep with the equal number of indicators per first order construct rule.  We 
conceptualize the items as reflective of the degree of expectation to share information 
(Tables 7, 8 & 13).  We use seven-point Likert scale to measure the items. 
Table 13. Criteria for determination of information sharing as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as reflective (Aulakh et al. 1996; 
Heide and John 1992).  All items share two important characteristics: 
there is an expectation to share information and the information shared 
will help the other party.  
Predictor ? We assume that there is an underlying element (construct) that predicts 
whether an expectation to share information exists.  We expect 
relationships with greater norms would have greater values across all 
indicators and vice versa.   
Dropping ? Given the high loadings presented by Heide and John (1992), we assert a 
priori that we will not lose information if we drop an item. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as the presence of a 
norm precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that the antecedents of information sharing explain all its 
components equally well. 
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4.2.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty both has a direct effect and is moderated by coordination needs (+) 
and opportunism risks (-).  Consistent with most research, uncertainty is measured 
through perceptions of environmental uncertainty, coordination needs through measures 
of interdependency, and opportunism risks through measures of opportunism (Table 14). 
Table 14. Measurement of uncertainty, coordination needs and opportunism risks 
Construct Items Reference Modified 
Consumer demand is very predictable for those 
products that use the components we source to our 
foreign customer 
Sales forecasts are very predictable for those products 
that use the components we source to our foreign 
customer 
Perceived 
Environmental 
Uncertainty  
[R] 
Retail sales are very predictable for those products that 
use the components we source to our foreign customer 
Wathne and 
Heide 
(2004) 
Rephrased 
Our company accomplishes our assigned tasks (i.e., 
production or service) independently from our foreign 
customer. 
Coordination 
Needs 
[R] 
The companies in our supply network go to a lot of 
trouble to coordinate each task (i.e., production or 
service order). 
Mohr 
(1971) and 
Van de Ven 
(1976) 
 
Adapted 
(converted 
to Likert, 
adapted to 
context, item 
rephrased) 
It is very difficult to evaluate accurately the quality of 
the resources or assets our foreign customer says it 
brings to the exchange. 
It is very difficult to evaluate the quality of the 
resource or assets our foreign customer is actually 
offering in exchange. 
Opportunism 
risks 
[R] 
We cannot be sure if our foreign customer has put 
forth maximal effort. 
Barney and 
Hansen 
(1994 p. 
176) 
Shane (1998 
p. 697) 
New 
(created 
from 
definitions 
provided by 
previous 
research) 
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4.2.2.1 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
We follow TCE’s conceptualization of uncertainty as an inability to predict future 
sales (Milliken 1987).  In particular, for the present context, this is downstream 
uncertainty.  We use three reflective items to measure environmental uncertainty (direct 
effect) adapted from Wathne and Heide (2004).  We conceptualize environmental 
uncertainty as volume uncertainty5.  In particular we measure whether sales (as consumer 
demand, retail sales, and sales forecasts) are predictable for the products sold to the 
international customer.  We use seven-point Likert scale to measure the items. 
Table 15. Criteria for determination of perceived environmental uncertainty as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as reflective (Wathne and Heide 
2004).  All items ask about the same phenomenon (predictability of 
future sales) in different ways.  
Predictor ? As said in the previous point, predictability of future sales predicts all 
three items. 
Dropping ? Given the high loadings presented by Wathne and Heide (2004), we assert 
a priori that we will not lose information if we drop an item.   
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as the predictability 
of future sales precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that uncertainty avoidance explains all components of digital 
integration equally well. 
 
                                                 
5 Environmental uncertainty has been conceptualized in different ways, including volume uncertainty, 
demand uncertainty, dynamism, complexity, et cetera.  Given the complexity of the concept, we adopt the 
conceptualization as volume uncertainty.  This conceptualization provides a more specific definition. 
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4.2.2.2 Coordination Needs 
Coordination needs arise as a result of interdependencies (Galbraith 1973; 
Galbraith 1977; Kumar and van Diesel 1996).  We use two reflective items to measure 
coordination needs based on the work of Mohr (1971) and Van de Ven (1976).  We 
measure the extent to which firms work independently (reversed) and coordinate tasks.  
Each item uses a seven-point Likert scale. 
Table 16. Criteria for determination of coordination needs as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as reflective (Mohr 1971; Van de 
Ven et al. 1976).  Both items inquire about the degree to which 
organizations work together and coordinate tasks.   
Predictor ? Working together is the underlying phenomenon to this construct and 
predicts both items. 
Dropping ? Given the high correlation presented by (Van de Ven et al. 1976), we 
assert a priori that we will not lose information if we drop an item. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as the task 
interdependence precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that coordination needs explains all components of digital 
integration equally well. 
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4.2.2.3 Opportunism Risks 
Opportunism risks, on the other hand, are related to opportunistic use of decision 
rights by the partners.  We use three formative seven-point Likert-scale items to measure 
opportunism risks.  The items measure adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse 
selection measures the extent to which parties can evaluate whether the other party is 
truthful about their abilities.  Moral hazard occurs when the parties cannot evaluate 
whether the other party puts maximum effort (Eisenhardt 1989).  These are usually 
considered separate items in the literature, and therefore, we consider opportunism risks 
formative.   
Table 17. Criteria for determination of opportunism risks as formative 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as formative.  Adverse selection 
and moral hazard are treated as separate phenomena.  We merge them 
into one construct (coordination needs)  
Predictor ? We don’t make any assumptions about how the construct predicts the 
items nor vise versa 
Dropping ? Given the high correlation presented by (Van de Ven et al. 1976), we 
assert a priori that we will not lose information if we drop an item. 
Change ? The items are separate.  A change in one item would require changes in 
other items only to maintain consistency, but not for theoretical reasons. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that opportunism risks explains all components of digital 
integration equally well. 
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4.2.3 Uncertainty Avoidance (culture) 
Culture may be assessed at two different levels: individual or national.  In line 
with recent research, we adopt a two-item reflective measure of individual uncertainty 
avoidance developed by Srite and Karahanna (2006).  The individual-level items inquire 
about the preference for rules and structure.  These items are recorded through a seven-
item Likert scale.  This is consistent with the unit of analysis (the individual) and captures 
the individual’s values better than the ecological variable (Srite and Karahanna 2006; 
Straub et al. 2002).  Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison and consistency with past 
literature, we also utilize the ecological (national) value.   
Table 18. Measurement of Uncertainty Avoidance 
Construct Items Reference Modified 
Rules and regulations are important because they 
inform workers what the organization expects of them. 
UAI 
(Espoused 
Values) Order and structure are very important in a work 
environment. 
Srite and 
Karahanna 
(2006) 
Original
as is 
UAI 
(National) 
Respondents get assigned 
one of the following 
values for 
• Headquarters 
• Birth 
• Residence 
U.S.: 46 
U.K.: 35 
Germany: 65 
www.geert-
hofstede.com 
Original
as is 
 
Table 19. Criteria for determination of uncertainty avoidance (individual) as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as reflective.  Furthermore, both 
items query about the preference structure (rules, regulations, order and 
structure). 
Predictor ? Uncertainty avoidance predicts the responses to the items.  
Dropping ? Srite and Karahanna (2006) indicate high reliability of the measures.  
Dropping an item should not affect the overall measurement of the 
construct, except for the fact that we would end up with a one-item 
construct. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as the preference for 
structure precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that uncertainty avoidance explains all components of digital 
integration equally well. 
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4.2.4 Power 
As indicated above, power is a moderated effect (stimuli x ability to influence).  
IT sophistication represents the willingness to integrate (stimuli), while the ability to 
influence is measured in a straight forward way (Table 20). 
Table 20. Measurement of IT sophistication and power 
Construct Items Reference Modified 
Information technology is important for the 
reduction of personnel in our organization. 
Information technology is important for the 
reduction of operational costs in our 
organization. 
Information technology is important for the 
improvement of productivity in our organization. 
Information technology is important for the 
improvement of access to information in our 
organization. 
Information technology is important for the 
improvement of the quality of decision making 
in our organization. 
Information technology is important for the 
improvement of competitiveness in our 
organization. 
IT 
sophistication 
(perceived 
benefits of IT) 
Information technology is important for the 
improvement of service to customers in our 
organization. 
Chwelos et 
al. (2001) 
Adapted 
(reworded 
as 
independent 
items) 
IT 
sophistication 
(management 
attitude) 
Please rate the attitude of your top management 
toward the deployment of information 
technology in your organization. 
Chwelos et 
al. (2001) 
As is 
(middle 
anchor 
removed) 
We can pretty much dictate how our foreign 
customer sells their product. 
Mohr et al. 
(1996) 
We can easily sell to other firms besides our 
customer. 
Power 
(us over them) 
We have a significant influence on our foreign 
customer’s operations. 
Chatterjee , 
(2002) 
Adapted 
(language 
change) 
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4.2.4.1 IT sophistication 
We used eight reflective items to measure IT sophistication developed by Pare 
and Raymond (1991) and adapted by Chwelos et al. (2001) (Table 20 & 21).  IT 
sophistication captures both the level of IT expertise and management in an organization 
(Chwelos et al. 2001; Iacovou 1995; Pare and Raymond 1991; Raymond and Pare 1992).  
In particular, we asked whether IT helps achieve efficiencies in the organization and the 
attitude of management towards IT.  We used seven seven-point Likert items and one 
seven-point semantic-differential item to measure IT sophistication (all reflective). 
Table 21. Criteria for determination of IT sophistication as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as reflective.  IT sophistication is 
conceptualized as expertise in IT use and management. 
Predictor ? IT sophistication predicts the responses to the items.  Higher levels of IT 
sophistication should relate to higher levels on the indicators. 
Dropping ? Dropping an item should not affect the overall measure of the construct, 
except for the fact that we would end up with a one-item construct. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as the IT expertise 
precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that all IT sophistication items explain all components of 
digital integration equally well. 
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4.2.4.2 Ability to Influence (Power) 
We use three reflective items (Tables 20 & 22) based on replaceability (Mohr et 
al. 1996) and ability to influence (Chatterjee 2002).  We use seven-point Likert scales to 
measure the items. 
Table 22. Criteria for determination of power as reflective 
Criterion Result Rationale 
Theory ? It has been conceptualized in the theory as reflective.   
Predictor ? Ability to influence predicts the responses to the items.  Higher levels of 
Ability to influence should relate to higher levels on the indicators. 
Dropping ? Dropping an item should not affect the overall measure of the construct. 
Change ? We posit that the conceptualization of the construct as replaceability 
precedes the conceptualization of the items. 
Causality 
(nomological 
network) 
? We predict that all ability to influence (as a moderator) items explain all 
components of digital integration equally well. 
 
4.2.5 Control Variables 
Besides the key, theoretical variables, we included two sets of control variables: 
one at the firm level and one at the individual level.  At the firm level we included 
measures of focal and partner firm size.  At the individual level we included measures of 
technological culturation. 
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Table 23. Firm-level control variables 
Construct Items Reference 
Focal firm 
size 
 
Partner firm 
size 
Your firm revenues (roughly; in dollars*): 
 
Revenues of your foreign customer (roughly; in dollars*): 
 
US (US Dollars): Germany (Euro) UK (British Pounds): 
Less than 3,000,000 Less than 2,000,000 Less than 1,500,000 
3,000,000 – 14,999,999 2,000,000 – 9,999,999 1,500,000 – 7,500,000 
15,000,000 – 74,999,999 10,000,000 – 49,999,999 7,500,000 – 39,999,999 
75,000,000 – 399,999,999 50,000,000 – 249,999,999 40,000,000 – 199,999,999 
More than 400,000,000 More than 250,000,000 More than 200,000,000 
 
Given the number of employees in your firm, your firm is a: 
Given the number of employees in your foreign customer, they 
are a: 
 
• Micro enterprise (1-9 employees) 
• Small enterprise (10-49 employees) 
• Medium enterprise (50-249 employees) 
• Medium-large enterprise (250-1000 employees)  
• Large enterprise (1000+ employees) # 
Commission 
of the 
European 
Communities 
(2003) 
* Only the values in one column were provided to respondents.  We used dollars for the U.S., 
pounds for the U.K., and Euros for Germany.  The scales were approximated to fit into whole 
values.  The following scale was used: 1 pound – 1.33 Euro – 2 US dollars consistent with 
exchange rates at time of data collection (May/2008). 
# We added the final category to distinguish medium-large from large enterprises.  We did this to 
better reflect the configuration of enterprises in the U.S. 
 
Table 24. Individual-level control variables 
Construct Items Reference 
Technological 
Culturation 
Number of trips abroad in last 10 years ___ 
How many years have you worked in an international division? 
___ 
Straub et al. 
(2002) 
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Chapter 5 Data collection and validation 
5.1 Pilot 
A pilot study was conducted to test the survey instrumentation.  The study took 
place at a major south-eastern U.S. university.  Sixty-five (65) graduate students 
participated in the pilot study, with fifty-nine valid responses.  F actor and reliability 
analyses were performed for measures, grammatical errors were corrected, and items 
were dropped.   
Table 25. Reliability of scales in pilot study 
Construct α 
IOS&K Specificity 0.848 
Information Flows Integration 0.652 
Monitoring 0.606 
Expectation of Information Sharing 0.655 
Market Uncertainty 0.865 
Coordination Needs 0.122 
Opportunism Risks n/a (formative) 
UAI (espoused values) 0.621 
UAI (national values) n/a (single item) 
IT sophistication (benefits) 0.804 
IT sophistication (management attitude) n/a (single item) 
Power (us over them) n/a (single item) 
Power (them over us) 0.655 
• Item in italics presents reliability issues. 
• α values over 0.6 are considered acceptable for early 
stages of research (Nunnally 1967) 
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5.1.1 Scales assessment 
Measures proved to have medium to good reliability scores (Table25).  Factor 
analysis of the criterion and predictor variables was performed to assess the integrity of 
the measures.   
5.1.1.1 Criterion variables 
On the criterion side, IOS&K specificity shows good reliability, while IFI, 
Monitoring (agency), and relational norms show low values but acceptable for earlier 
stages of research  
(α > 0.6 ;Nunnally, 1967).  A factor analysis also shows a high degree of correlation 
between the four dimensions of digital integration.  This was foreseeable given the 
characteristics of each of the dimensions: IOS&K specificity represents the conduit for 
information sharing; an expectation of information sharing should lead to greater 
information sharing; and information sharing is needed for monitoring.  However, the 
factor analysis still shows four main components consistent with the dimensions (Table 
26).   
Table 26. Criterion variable item pattern matrix (oblimin rotation) 
Component 
 1 2 3 4 
DISPEC1 .807    
DISPEC2 .924    
DISPEC3 .838    
DIIFI1  .814   
DIIFI2  .685   
DIIFI3    .737 
DIAG1   .767  
DIAG2  .656   
DIAG3   .823  
DISN1    .715 
DISN2   -.447 .717 
DISN3    .706 
Only values >0.35 are shown. 
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One component is consistent with IOS&K specificity and the uniqueness of 
applications (DISPECT1) and domain knowledge (DISPEC2 and DISPEC3).  A second 
component groups information sharing items, including sharing of delivery schedules 
(DIIFI1), performance metrics (DIIFI2) and monitoring of marketing activities (DIAG2).  
A third component aggregates information sharing norms (DISN1, DISN2 and DISN3), 
plus carries along the sharing of inventory information.  This analysis shows some cross-
loadings.  One item of IIF loads on information sharing norms and one item of 
monitoring loads on IIF.  A graphic analysis shows that the items do cluster together 
(Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Loading plot of components  
 of digital integration 
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5.1.1.2 Predictor variables 
On the predictor side, market uncertainty and IT sophistication show good 
reliabilities, UAI (espoused values) and power (ability to influence) shows lower 
reliability (but still acceptable by Nunnally’s standards), while coordination shows poor 
reliability.  These values are acceptable for all except coordination due to the fact that we 
used existing scales.  Factor analyses were run to evaluate the discriminant characteristics 
of the measures.  A first run included all predictor variables.  A second run included only 
those predictor variables that presented issues: coordination had two separate items that 
loaded on other components, culture had an IT sophistication item loaded on its 
component, IT sophistication, and power (our customer’s ability to influence us).  Further 
runs were performed to understand the various interactions between the predictors.  
Following is the analysis: 
(1) Market uncertainty loads on its own factor (only considered in the first run).  No 
changes were made to this scale. 
(2) Coordination seems to load on two different factors.  Coordination has already 
shown reliability problems.  Thus, it is not surprising that it does not load on one 
unique factor.  One item interacts with culture, while the second one dominates its 
own component.  Content analysis of the items show that one item refers to 
interdependencies, while the second refers to coordination per se.  As a result, 
while the items remain as they are, the construct was modeled as formative. 
(3) Opportunism, though a formative construct, loads on its own component (only 
considered in the first run).  No changes were made to this scale. 
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(4) Culture loads on its own component.  Other items (ITSPH7 and COOR2) also 
load on this component.  A second factor analysis is performed to further 
discriminate this dimension.  Since the scale is has already been tested in prior 
research, it will remain unchanged.   
(5) Overall, IT sophistication shows acceptable loadings on six of seven items as 
shown in Table 27.  The seventh item (technology is important for service 
improvement) seems to interact with culture.  The management component 
conflicts with a component of power.  Given the apparent interaction of item 
seven with culture, this item will not be considered in the final analysis.  Other 
items remain unchanged. 
(6) Power (as ability to influence) shows low reliability scores.  This measure, 
however, loads cleanly on its own component.  Additionally, when the data is 
filtered by the degree of knowledge about B2B relationships (N=49), the 
reliability score rises to 0.700. 
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Table 27. Predictor variable item pattern matrix (oblimin rotation) 
Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MU1  .768  -.363    
MU2  .792      
MU3  .865      
COOR1      .780  
COOR2     .534   
OPPOR1   .880     
OPPOR2   .889     
OPPOR3   .758     
CUL1     .623   
CUL2     .773   
ITSPH1 .662     .477  
ITSPH2 .806     .384  
ITSPH3 .788       
ITSPH4 .740       
ITSPH5 .663 .479      
ITSPH6 .590 .495      
ITSPH7     .684   
ITSPH8    .350   .615 
PW1       .815 
PW2    -.718    
PW3    .746    
PW4    .688    
Only values greater than 0.35 are shown. 
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5.2 Field Study 
For the final administration for the instrument, we hired a market research 
company to run the survey among their panel of members.  The research company 
preselected candidates based on their self-reported demographics (Table 5 above).  These 
candidates were sent invitation emails with a URL pointing to the survey.  The 
participants are then asked two screening questions to verify their qualifications: 
What best describes your current functional role at work? 
? Accounting / Finance 
? Administration 
? Communications / PR 
? Customer Service 
? Design / Engineering 
? Human Resources 
? Information Technology 
? Marketing / Advertising 
? Operations / Production 
? Research and Development 
? Sales / Business Development 
? Other 
 
Only participants that selected “Sales / Business Development” moved on to the 
second question:  
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Which of the following functions do you perform? 
? Sell products and/or services to Domestic clients ONLY 
? Sell products and/or services to International clients ONLY 
? Sell products and/or services to Domestic AND International clients (but mostly 
Domestic clients) 
? Sell products and/or services to Domestic AND International clients (but mostly 
International clients) 
? Sell products and/or services to a fairly even mix of Domestic AND International 
clients 
? I do not sell products and/or services – I am responsible for another aspect of 
business development within my company 
 
Therefore, only those who have some degree of international contact (radio 
buttons 2, 3, 4, and 5) move on to the survey.  The survey establishes a cut-off point after 
the necessary participants completed the surveys.   
5.2.1 Sample 
In toto, 215 people participated from 3 countries in June of 2008; twelve 
responses were discarded (details are given below).  The final number of responses (203) 
is well within the recommended minimum of 10 respondents per item/predictor for the 
construct with the most items/predictors.  In our case, DI has 12 items (all items as 
formative to the construct, this is explained later) and 12 predictors (UNC, COOR, 
OPPORT, UNC*COOR, UNC*OPPORT, CU_UAI, IT_SOPH, PWR_US, 
IT_SOPH*PWR_US, plus the control variables SZ_US, SZ_CU, and DEM_TC). 
The demographics for the sample are reported in the following table. 
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Table 28. Demographics for field study 
Variable Category/Values N % N Mean S.D.
U.S.  61 30.0 
U.K.  71 35.0 
Country 
Germany  71 35.0 
203 n/a n/a 
Male 161 79.3 Gender 
Female 42 20.7 
203 n/a n/a 
20-25 2 1.0 
25-29 24 11.8 
30-34 37 18.2 
35-39 38 18.7 
40-44 45 22.2 
45-49 24 11.8 
50-54 17 8.4 
55-59 11 5.4 
Age 
60-65 5 2.5 
203 40.0 9.1 
High school 57 28.1 
Undergraduate 82 40.4 
Master’s 60 29.6 
Education 
Doctorate 4 2.0 
203 n/a n/a 
1-5 15 7.4 
6-10 52 25.6 
11-15 42 20.7 
16-25 58 28.6 
Experience 
>25 36 17.7 
203 17.1 9.8 
Sell products and/or services to International 
clients ONLY 
26 12.8 
Sell products and/or services to Domestic 
AND International clients (but mostly 
Domestic clients) 
88 43.3 
Sell products and/or services to Domestic 
AND International clients (but mostly 
International clients) 
49 24.1 
Functional 
role 
(screener 
question) 
  
Sell products and/or services to a fairly even 
mix of Domestic AND International clients 
40 19.7 
203 n/a n/a 
Top Management 11 5.4 
Middle Management 114 56.2 
Position 
Supervisory Management 24 11.8 
203 n/a n/a 
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Table 28. Demographics for field study 
Variable Category/Values N % N Mean S.D.
Professional or Administrative position 54 26.6 
0 58 28.6 
1-5 74 36.5 
6-10 31 15.3 
11-20 26 12.8 
Subordinates 
>20 14 6.9 
203 n/a n/a 
Less than $3,000,000 5 2.5 
$3,000,000 – $14,999,999 9 4.4 
$15,000,000 - $74,999,999 22 10.8 
$75,000,000 - $399,999,999 49 24.1 
Revenues 
More than $400,000,000 118 58.1 
203 n/a n/a 
Less than $3,000,000 41 20.2 
$3,000,000 – $14,999,999 39 19.2 
$15,000,000 - $74,999,999 33 16.3 
$75,000,000 - $399,999,999 28 13.8 
Revenues of 
Customer 
More than $400,000,000 62 30.5 
203 n/a n/a 
Micro enterprise (1-9 employees) 6 3.0 
Small enterprise( 10-49 employees) 3 1.5 
Medium enterprise (50-249 employees) 23 11.3 
Medium-large enterprise (250-1000 
employees) 
34 16.7 
# of 
Employees 
Large enterprise (1000+ employees) 137 67.5 
203 n/a n/a 
Micro enterprise (1-9 employees) 14 6.9 
Small enterprise( 10-49 employees) 19 9.4 
Medium enterprise (50-249 employees) 32 15.8 
Medium-large enterprise (250-1000 
employees) 
41 20.2 
# of 
Employees of 
Customer 
Large enterprise (1000+ employees) 97 47.8 
203 n/a n/a 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting  0 0.0 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction  
5 2.5 
Utilities  1 0.5 
Construction  2 1.0 
Manufacturing  59 29.1 
Industry 
Wholesale Trade  9 4.4 
203 n/a n/a 
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Table 28. Demographics for field study 
Variable Category/Values N % N Mean S.D.
Retail Trade  11 5.4 
Transportation and Warehousing  11 5.4 
Information [communications] 29 14.3 
Finance and Insurance  15 7.4 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  9 4.4 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services  
13 6.4 
Management of Companies and Enterprises  2 1.0 
Administrative and Support [Services] and 
Waste Management and Remediation 
Services  
2 1.0 
Educational Services  1 0.5 
Health Care and Social Assistance  8 3.9 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  4 2.0 
Accommodation and Food Services  8 3.9 
Other Services (except Public 
Administration)  
14 6.9 
Public Administration 0 0.0 
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5.3 Data Manipulation 
5.3.1 Invalid responses 
Upon visual inspection, twelve responses were removed from the study.  We 
calculated standard deviations within responses in two blocks of data consisting of 18 and 
28 responses respectively.  Twelve respondents presented zero variance in one or both 
blocks.  Since the respondents were rewarded for their participation, it is assumed that 
they completed the survey without regard for the content.  Figure 10 presents the 
distribution of response times and the discarded responses.   
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Figure 10. Distribution of Response Times 
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We also performed successive reliability analyses for subsamples that included 
responses with increasing completion times (for example, the first point represents the 
reliability for all constructs calculated using all (valid) responses, the second point, 
represents reliabilities for all constructs for responses with completion times greater than 
four minutes only, and so on).  We utilized recoded values for this analysis (see below).  
Figure 11 shows the reliabilities for these subsamples.  These analysis shows that 
reliabilities are stable for different completion times.  PW_CU was discarded due to poor 
psychometric properties and COOR was modeled as formative.  Lower reliabilities at 
higher response times might due to the lower responses left as a result of the filter. 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Reliabilities as a Function of Response Times 
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5.3.2 Missing values  
The survey did not allow for missing values.  The system required that all items 
be responded to. 
5.3.3 Re-coding 
We recoded the data for three reasons: (1) most answers were recoded, (2) we 
reversed values for the items that were reverse-scaled, and (3) we added values for 
national culture.  First, all answers provided by the vendor were coded as 1=strongly 
agree…7=strongly disagree.  The items were rescaled to present increasing values for 
increasing levels of agreement.  We utilized the following equation: 
xi’ = 8 – xi, where : 
xi' is the new value, and  
xi is the original value 
 
 
Second, some items are reverse-scaled.  While most methodologies can deal with 
such scales (including partial least squares or PLS), the internal workings of the 
algorithm recommend using scales with the same sign on all items.  The calculation of 
reliability scales also calls for positive correlations between items.   
Third, secondary data values are added based on the reported countries.  Tables 
29 and 30 present the descriptive statistics for the the latent scores and items respectively.  
Once the data is recoded we proceeded to perform the analysis.  The analysis was 
performed in two stages: measurement validation and model testing.   
 
  
74
Table 29. Descriptive Statistics for Latent Variables (equal loadings) 
Variable N Valid Mean Median Std. 
Deviation
Range Minimum Maximum
DI 203 4.11 4.08 0.98 5.00 1.42 6.42 
DI_SPEC 203 2.84 2.67 1.48 6.00 1.00 7.00 
DI_IFI 203 4.20 4.33 1.69 6.00 1.00 7.00 
DI_AG 203 4.73 5.00 1.32 6.00 1.00 7.00 
DI_ISN 203 4.67 5.00 1.21 6.00 1.00 7.00 
UNC 203 3.93 4.00 1.42 6.00 1.00 7.00 
COOR 203 3.86 4.00 0.85 5.50 1.00 6.50 
OPPOR 203 4.44 4.33 1.15 5.33 1.67 7.00 
CU_UAI 203 6.25 6.50 0.72 4.50 2.50 7.00 
IT_SOPH 203 5.73 5.83 0.81 4.33 2.67 7.00 
PW_US 203 3.30 3.33 1.03 5.33 1.00 6.33 
PW_CU 203 3.42 3.50 1.11 5.50 1.00 6.50 
UNCxCOOR 203 15.15 15.00 6.21 32.00 1.00 33.00 
UNCxOP 203 17.59 16.00 8.43 44.67 2.00 46.67 
PWxSPH 203 18.91 18.67 6.79 38.28 5.00 43.28 
UNCxCOOR_std 203 0.01 0.01 1.17 11.69 -4.78 6.91 
UNCxOP_std 203 0.10 0.02 1.10 8.83 -4.56 4.27 
PWxSPH_std 203 0.03 0.02 1.03 9.65 -5.61 4.04 
CON_SZC 203 3.54 3.50 1.26 4.00 1.00 5.00 
CON_SZU 203 4.38 5.00 0.90 4.00 1.00 5.00 
DEM_TC 203 78.67 40.00 96.79 500.00 0.00 500.00 
 
Table 30. Descriptive Statistics for Items 
Variable N Valid Mean Median Std. 
Deviation
Range Minimum Maximum
DI_SPEC1 203 2.75 2 1.78 6 1 7 
DI_SPEC2 203 2.89 3 1.74 6 1 7 
DI_SPEC3 203 2.88 2 1.79 6 1 7 
DI_IFI1 203 4.60 5 1.79 6 1 7 
DI_IFI2 203 4.06 4 1.85 6 1 7 
DI_IFI3 203 3.93 4 2.08 6 1 7 
DI_AG1 203 4.81 5 1.56 6 1 7 
DI_AG2 203 4.74 5 1.56 6 1 7 
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Table 30. Descriptive Statistics for Items 
Variable N Valid Mean Median Std. 
Deviation
Range Minimum Maximum
DI_AG3 203 4.63 5 1.49 6 1 7 
DI_ISN1 203 4.63 5 1.78 6 1 7 
DI_ISN2 203 4.89 5 1.55 6 1 7 
DI_ISN3 203 4.49 5 1.51 6 1 7 
UNC1 203 4.01 4 1.61 6 1 7 
UNC2 203 3.98 4 1.54 6 1 7 
UNC3 203 3.78 4 1.57 6 1 7 
COOR1 203 2.70 2 1.39 6 1 7 
COOR2 203 5.01 5 1.21 6 1 7 
OPPOR1 203 4.40 5 1.37 6 1 7 
OPPOR2 203 4.32 4 1.40 6 1 7 
OPPOR3 203 4.60 5 1.30 6 1 7 
CU_UAI1 203 6.37 6 0.67 4 3 7 
CU_UAI2 203 6.13 6 0.90 5 2 7 
IT_SOPH1 203 4.41 5 1.66 6 1 7 
IT_SOPH2 203 5.73 6 1.14 6 1 7 
IT_SOPH3 203 6.10 6 1.06 6 1 7 
IT_SOPH4 203 6.24 6 0.89 4 3 7 
IT_SOPH5 203 5.82 6 1.10 5 2 7 
IT_SOPH6 203 6.07 6 0.96 6 1 7 
IT_SOPH7 203 6.24 6 0.94 5 2 7 
IT_SOPH8 203 5.63 6 1.30 6 1 7 
PW_US1 203 2.02 2 1.13 5 1 6 
PW_US2 203 4.63 5 1.63 6 1 7 
PW_US3 203 3.24 3 1.79 6 1 7 
PW_CU1 203 2.57 2 1.46 6 1 7 
PW_CU2 203 4.27 5 1.62 6 1 7 
CON_SZC1 203 3.15 3 1.53 4 1 5 
CON_SZC2 203 3.93 4 1.28 4 1 5 
CON_SZU1 203 4.31 5 1.00 4 1 5 
CON_SZU2 203 4.44 5 0.96 4 1 5 
DEM_TC 203 78.67 40 96.79 500 0 500 
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5.4 Measurement Validation 
While content validity was determined in the design stage (i.e., theoretical review 
and pilot study), during this stage we seek to establish convergent and discriminant 
validity of the measures.  Convergent validity tests whether the items that measure one 
particular construct are related to each other and work together (Trochim 2000).  
Discriminant validity, on the other hand, tests whether items work better with related 
items (i.e., other items in related to the same construct) than with non-related items 
(Trochim 2000).   
5.4.1 Validation Techniques 
We used two primary tools to assess construct validity: Cronbach’s α and partial 
least squares path modeling (PLS).  Cronbach’s α is a technique specifically developed to 
test for reliability of measures (Cronbach 1951).  PLS, on the other hand is a structural 
equation modeling based technique (SEM) which allows for the simultaneous testing of 
both the measurement and the theoretical model simultaneously.  We used SPSS to 
measure Cronbach’s α and SmartPLS (Ringle et al. 2005) for PLS structural model 
testing, validation, and component reliability.   
We used different coefficients to assess convergent and discriminant validity of 
the reflective measures.  To assess convergent validity, we used reliability coefficients 
(Cronbach’s α), average variance extracted (AVE), and PLS’s internal consistency 
coefficients.  To test for discriminant validity, we used item-to-construct correlations, 
item-to-item correlations and average variance extracted (AVE).  Reliability coefficients 
and AVE are scale-related tests, while internal consistency and item-to-construct 
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correlations are item-related tests.  Recommended heuristics to include an item within a 
scale are shown in Table 31. 
5.4.2 Assessment of Convergent Validity 
Table 31. Heuristics for the assessment of construct validity (convergent and discriminant)
Technique Level Validity Heuristic Reference 
Cronbach’s α Construct Convergent >.60  Nunnally (1967)  
AVE (PLS) Construct Convergent >.50 
Larcker and 
Lessig 
(1980), 
Fornell 
(1982) 
Internal consistency 
(PLS) Construct Convergent >.60   
Outer loadings (PLS) Item Convergent >.70 Fornell (1982) 
Item-to-construct 
correlations Item 
Convergent 
and 
Discriminant 
Higher correlation to 
its own construct than 
to other constructs. 
 
Construct-to-
construct correlations 
vs.  
Construct AVE 
Construct Discriminant 
Square root of AVE 
should be higher than 
any construct-to-
construct correlation 
 
 
To evaluate the internal consistency we utilized a hierarchical component 
approach using repeated indicators: the indicators of the first order constructs (DISPEC, 
DIIFI, DIAG, and DIISN) are directly connected to the second order construct (DI).  We 
also include model that includes DI as a second order construct as well asDI’s  its 
components (DISPEC, DIIFI, DIAG, and DIISN) as separate constructs, as shown in 
figure 12.  Table 32 shows the convergent validity results for the reflective measures.  
Most of the measures present good reliability coefficients. (Cronbach α).  On the other 
hand, some measures do present issues.   
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Figure 12. Model utilized to test construct validity 
 
On the other hand, some measures do present issues.  Power shows very poor 
reliability with all coefficients being under the recommended thresholds.  The results for 
power are surprising.  A possible explanation for the poor reliability of power is the 
untested change in language from suppliers to customers that took place after the pilot.  
We used item-level diagnostics to further investigate these issues. 
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Table 32. Summary of convergent validity results 
Construct N of Items Cronbach 
Alpha  AVE  
Composite 
Reliability 
IOS&K Specificity 3 (DI_SPEC1, 
DI_SPEC2, DI_SPEC3) 0.783 0.700 0.875 
Information Flow Integration 3 (DI_IFI1, DI_IFI2, 
DI_IFI3) 0.865 0.787 0.917 
Agency Mechanisms 
(monitoring) 
3 (DI_AG1, DI_AG2, 
DI_AG3) 0.827 0.743 0.897 
Information Sharing Norms 3 (DI_ISN1, DI_ISN2, 
DI_ISN3) 0.609 0.555 0.788 
Uncertainty 3 (UNC1, UNC2, 
UNC3) 0.884 0.812 0.928 
Culture (UAI) 2 (CU_UAI1, 
CU_UAI2) 0.815 0.844 0.915 
IT Sophistication 6 (IT_SOPH1, 
IT_SOPH2, IT_SOPH3, 
IT_SOPH4, IT_SOPH5, 
IT_SOPH6) 
0.820 0.538 0.867 
Power of Us  
(over customer) 
3 (PW_US1, PW_US2, 
PW_US3) 0.343 0.447 0.597 
Size of Our Firm (control) 2 (CON_SZU1, 
CON_SZU2) 0.746 0.780 0.876 
Size of Customer (control) 2 (CON_SZC1, 
CON_SZC2) 0.783 0.700 0.875 
Items in italics present reliability issues.  Grayed cells highlight the problems. 
 
 
PLS’ outer model loadings are used to test convergent validity at the item-level.  
Table 33 presents the results for the model.  Most items present acceptable loadings 
(above the 0.7 threshold and statistically significant).  The loadings, however, point out 
problems with one IT-sophistication and one power item (Table 33).   
Item-to-construct and item-to-item correlations were also utilized to test 
simultaneously convergent and discriminant validity, by showing that items do correlate 
with their construct more than with others (discriminant) (Table 34) and with “sibling” 
items (convergent) more than with unrelated items (discriminant) (Table 35).   
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Table 33. PLS outer model loadings 
Item Sample 
Loadings 
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
DI_SPEC1 0.7604 0.7237 0.0989 7.6849 ** 
DI_SPEC2 0.8789 0.8913 0.0442 19.8819 ** 
DI_SPEC3 0.8655 0.8700 0.0529 16.3727 ** 
DI_IFI1 0.8852 0.8863 0.0176 50.1812 ** 
DI_IFI2 0.9127 0.9093 0.0144 63.2770 ** 
DI_IFI3 0.8632 0.8606 0.0241 35.8654 ** 
DI_AG1 0.8117 0.8094 0.0409 19.8391 ** 
DI_AG2 0.8606 0.8545 0.0275 31.3490 ** 
DI_AG3 0.9112 0.9115 0.0133 68.7672 ** 
DI_ISN1 0.8255 0.8220 0.0496 16.6261 ** 
DI_ISN2 0.6438 0.6475 0.0892 7.2135 ** 
DI_ISN3 0.7547 0.7344 0.0814 9.2698 ** 
UNC1 0.8996 0.8984 0.0189 47.4740 ** 
UNC2 0.9046 0.9018 0.0195 46.4620 ** 
UNC3 0.8991 0.8967 0.0194 46.2349 ** 
CU_UAI1 0.9269 0.9025 0.0971 9.5461 ** 
CU_UAI2 0.9101 0.9002 0.0942 9.6619 ** 
IT_SOPH1 0.2823 0.2623 0.2537 1.1129 n/s 
IT_SOPH2 0.7270 0.6738 0.1860 3.9084 ** 
IT_SOPH3 0.8024 0.7388 0.1806 4.4433 ** 
IT_SOPH4 0.7372 0.6819 0.1814 4.0635 ** 
IT_SOPH5 0.8389 0.7939 0.1284 6.5325 ** 
IT_SOPH6 0.8548 0.8037 0.1357 6.3010 ** 
PW_US1 -0.0637 -0.0648 0.1615 0.3945 n/s 
PW_US2 0.8604 0.8540 0.0394 21.8569 ** 
PW_US3 0.7723 0.7567 0.0653 11.8251 ** 
CON_SZU1 0.9198 0.9149 0.0345 26.6322 ** 
CON_SZU2 0.9256 0.9281 0.0225 41.1253 ** 
CON_SZC1 0.8030 0.8103 0.1571 5.1104 ** 
CON_SZC2 0.9567 0.9012 0.1413 6.7720 ** 
DEM_TC 1 1 0 n/a 
** For 1-tailed tests, t>2.35 is significant at 0.01. (t>2.60 for 2-tailed test) 
* For 1-tailed tests, t>1.65 is significant at 0.05. (t>1.97 for 2-tailed test) 
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Table 34. PLS cross loadings (reflective constructs) 
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DI_SPEC1 0.760** 0.157* 0.157* -0.033 -0.042 -0.043 -0.054 0.098 0.001 -0.037 
DI_SPEC2 0.879** 0.144* 0.077 0.023 -0.008 -0.002 -0.013 0.109 -0.092 -0.015 
DI_SPEC3 0.866** 0.124* 0.041 0.066 0.095 -0.073 -0.024 0.189** -0.075 -0.012 
DI_IFI1 0.133* 0.885** 0.450** 0.470** 0.318** 0.103 0.133* 0.279** 0.112 0.237** 
DI_IFI2 0.156* 0.913** 0.447** 0.531** 0.316** 0.050 0.156* 0.334** 0.126* 0.246** 
DI_IFI3 0.163** 0.863** 0.445** 0.472** 0.335** 0.079 0.025 0.394** 0.067 0.228** 
DI_AG1 0.103 0.434** 0.812** 0.410** 0.273** 0.099 0.207** 0.320** -0.009 0.118* 
DI_AG2 0.079 0.416** 0.861** 0.326** 0.312** 0.060 0.044 0.359** 0.066 0.169** 
DI_AG3 0.107 0.456** 0.911** 0.346** 0.409** 0.121* 0.174** 0.332** 0.062 0.142* 
DI_ISN1 0.028 0.638** 0.369** 0.825** 0.361** 0.070 0.135* 0.351** -0.005 0.168** 
DI_ISN2 0.030 0.251** 0.169** 0.644** 0.190** 0.042 0.097 0.241** -0.043 0.017 
DI_ISN3 -0.008 0.259** 0.351** 0.755** 0.285** 0.013 0.047 0.319** 0.020 0.091 
UNC1 0.023 0.326** 0.335** 0.357** 0.900** 0.070 0.181** 0.560** -0.032 0.156* 
UNC2 0.016 0.322** 0.326** 0.355** 0.905** 0.102 0.187** 0.504** -0.035 0.154* 
UNC3 0.009 0.336** 0.383** 0.338** 0.899** 0.064 0.101 0.505** 0.007 0.145* 
CU_UAI1 -0.041 0.069 0.113 0.064 0.114 0.927** 0.273** 0.102 -0.039 0.156* 
CU_UAI2 -0.047 0.092 0.082 0.043 0.043 0.910** 0.246** -0.057 0.008 0.033 
IT_SOPH1 0.103 0.055 0.038 -0.021 0.146* 0.074 0.282** 0.115 0.040 -0.019 
IT_SOPH2 0.026 0.067 0.131* 0.040 0.113 0.176** 0.727** -0.002 0.048 0.049 
IT_SOPH3 -0.040 0.020 0.144* 0.117* 0.101 0.177** 0.802** 0.040 -0.005 0.014 
IT_SOPH4 -0.105 0.097 0.054 0.111 0.126* 0.322** 0.737** 0.014 0.040 0.085 
IT_SOPH5 0.006 0.126* 0.155* 0.067 0.154* 0.227** 0.839** 0.099 0.024 0.087 
IT_SOPH6 -0.045 0.134* 0.141* 0.156* 0.165** 0.230** 0.855** 0.120* -0.033 0.104 
PW_US1 0.036 -0.060 0.011 -0.145* 0.000 -0.101 -0.123* -0.064 -0.127* -0.079 
PW_US2 0.210** 0.362** 0.325** 0.336** 0.434** 0.023 0.138* 0.860** 0.094 0.129* 
PW_US3 0.042 0.240** 0.324** 0.320** 0.535** 0.005 -0.041 0.772** -0.212** -0.022 
CON_SZC1 -0.003 0.087 0.005 -0.019 0.018 0.021 0.005 0.019 0.803** 0.390** 
CON_SZC2 -0.086 0.112 0.063 -0.001 -0.038 -0.034 0.015 -0.062 0.957** 0.434** 
CON_SZU1 -0.007 0.248** 0.143* 0.129* 0.135* 0.102 0.101 0.113 0.434** 0.920** 
CON_SZU2 -0.041 0.245** 0.165** 0.129* 0.175** 0.094 0.062 0.042 0.421** 0.926** 
** For 1-tailed tests, t>2.34 is significant at 0.01. (t>2.60 for 2-tailed test) 
* For 1-tailed tests, t>1.65 is significant at 0.05. (t>1.97 for 2-tailed test) 
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5.4.3 Assessment of Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity at the construct level is assessed by comparing construct-to-
construct correlations to the square root of the AVE.  All constructs show acceptable 
comparative values (Table 36).  Both cross-loadings (item-to-construct) and item-to-item 
correlation tables show acceptable levels for most indicators (Tables 34 and 35).  Cross-
loadings analysis shows that ITSOPH1 loads more with its own construct than with any 
other construct, while PW_US1 still presents problems.  The item-to-item correlations 
shows that both IT_SOPH1 and PW_US1 present problems, so much so that the low 
correlations affect the rest of the items in the table.  As such, we removed the items from 
the table and re-analyzed the results (Table 35).  Additionally, DI_ISN1 and the 
remaining PW_US items show discriminant validity issues in the inter-item correlation 
table, but they present good discriminant results in the item-to-construct table.  Finally, 
some items show significant correlations with items on other constructs, though lower 
than with their siblings.  This is expected since it is a reflection of the theoretical model. 
5.4.4 Assessment of Control Variables 
Most of the control variables show good reliability scores.  Of these, customer’s 
power over us (PW_CU) presents problems.  This item shows very low inter-item 
correlations and Cronbach α.  It does not pass the discriminant validity tests either.  This 
is not surprising given that the language is similar to PW_US.  Size of our firm and our 
customer (SZ_US and SZ_CU respectively) show good convergent and discriminant 
scores and pass all tests.   
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Table 35. Item-to-item Pearson correlations 
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DI_SPEC1 --                 
DI_SPEC2 0.46 ** --                
DI_SPEC3 0.42 ** 0.75 ** --               
DI_IFI1 0.13  0.12  0.08  --              
DI_IFI2 0.12  0.14 * 0.14  0.74 ** --             
DI_IFI3 0.18 * 0.12  0.11  0.61 ** 0.69 ** --            
DI_AG1 0.10  0.09  0.07  0.38 ** 0.39 ** 0.38 ** --           
DI_AG2 0.14 * 0.05  0.00  0.35 ** 0.36 ** 0.40 ** 0.50 ** --          
DI_AG3 0.16 * 0.06  0.04  0.43 ** 0.41 ** 0.38 ** 0.65 ** 0.69 ** --         
DI_ISN1 0.03  0.04  0.06  0.54 ** 0.59 ** 0.56 ** 0.37 ** 0.27 ** 0.33 ** --        
DI_ISN2 0.02  0.04  0.05  0.25 ** 0.23 ** 0.19 ** 0.16 * 0.12  0.16 * 0.31 ** --       
DI_ISN3 0.03  0.03  0.04  0.19 ** 0.28 ** 0.22 ** 0.35 ** 0.31 ** 0.26 ** 0.37 ** 0.34 ** --      
UNC1 0.04  0.00  0.09  0.29 ** 0.28 ** 0.29 ** 0.28 ** 0.27 ** 0.32 ** 0.34 ** 0.16 * 0.27 ** --     
UNC2 0.07  0.03  0.08  0.29 ** 0.29 ** 0.28 ** 0.22 ** 0.24 ** 0.37 ** 0.35 ** 0.17 * 0.24 ** 0.73 ** --    
UNC3 0.01  0.05  0.08  0.28 ** 0.28 ** 0.33 ** 0.24 ** 0.33 ** 0.42 ** 0.29 ** 0.18 ** 0.27 ** 0.70 ** 0.72 ** --   
COOR1 0.12  0.26 ** 0.14 * 0.12  0.09  0.11  0.10  0.06  0.00  0.32 ** 0.16 * 0.20 ** 0.23 ** 0.16 * 0.17 * --  
COOR2 0.07  0.12  0.11  0.40 ** 0.35 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 ** 0.39 ** 0.30 ** 0.22 ** 0.20 ** 0.25 ** 0.24 ** 0.21 ** 0.21 ** 0.15 * -- 
OPPOR1 0.02  0.08  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.08  0.14 * 0.09  0.05  0.07  0.13  0.23 ** 
OPPOR2 0.04  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.02  0.01  0.12  0.04  0.00  0.12  0.19 ** 0.07  0.03  0.05  0.10  0.21 ** 
OPPOR3 0.09  0.11  0.07  0.12  0.04  0.10  0.00  0.07  0.06  0.15 * 0.09  0.14  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.13  0.05  
CU_UAI1 0.05  0.00  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.13  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.03  0.03  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.14 * 0.11  
CU_UAI2 0.02  0.01  0.09  0.12  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.12  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.03  0.07  0.01  0.04  0.11  
IT_SOPH2 0.00  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.11  0.01  0.18 ** 0.04  0.13  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.16 * 0.09  0.06  0.11  0.08  
IT_SOPH3 0.06  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.25 ** 0.00  0.14 * 0.08  0.10  0.09  0.12  0.11  0.04  0.14 * 0.07  
IT_SOPH4 0.12  0.07  0.07  0.15 * 0.11  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.07  0.12  0.12  0.01  0.16 * 0.13  0.05  0.16 * 0.03  
IT_SOPH5 0.00  0.02  0.00  0.12  0.16 * 0.06  0.16 * 0.04  0.20 ** 0.12  0.05  0.04  0.17 * 0.18 * 0.08  0.09  0.15 * 
IT_SOPH6 0.04  0.03  0.04  0.13  0.16 * 0.07  0.16 * 0.07  0.14 * 0.17 * 0.11  0.06  0.12  0.20 ** 0.13  0.11  0.10  
PW_US2 0.11  0.20 ** 0.22 ** 0.29 ** 0.32 ** 0.35 ** 0.29 ** 0.26 ** 0.29 ** 0.29 ** 0.19 ** 0.26 ** 0.39 ** 0.41 ** 0.38 ** 0.03  0.24 ** 
PW_US3 0.03  0.02  0.09  0.15 * 0.21 ** 0.28 ** 0.23 ** 0.33 ** 0.27 ** 0.25 ** 0.19 ** 0.27 ** 0.55 ** 0.43 ** 0.47 ** 0.18 ** 0.21 ** 
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Table 35. Item-to-item Pearson correlations (continued) 
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OPPOR1 --            
OPPOR2 0.77 ** --           
OPPOR3 0.47 ** 0.50 ** --          
CU_UAI1 0.00  0.00  0.03  --         
CU_UAI2 0.05  0.00  0.04  0.69 ** --        
IT_SOPH2 0.13  0.13  0.12  0.17 * 0.16 * --       
IT_SOPH3 0.06  0.03  0.09  0.17 * 0.15 * 0.65 ** --      
IT_SOPH4 0.00  0.03  0.03  0.30 ** 0.29 ** 0.44 ** 0.49 ** --     
IT_SOPH5 0.09  0.00  0.08  0.21 ** 0.21 ** 0.48 ** 0.55 ** 0.56 ** --    
IT_SOPH6 0.03  0.04  0.02  0.23 ** 0.19 ** 0.46 ** 0.57 ** 0.52 ** 0.68 ** --   
PW_US2 0.06  0.05  0.00  0.09  0.05  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.15 * 0.17 * --  
PW_US3 0.03  0.07  0.13  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.09  0.01  0.01  0.36 ** -- 
** t>2.60 is significant at 0.01 (two-tailed) 
* t>1.97 is significant at 0.05 (two-tailed) 
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Table 36. PLS AVE and construct-to-construct correlations 
 DI_SPEC DI_IFI DI_AG DI_ISN UNC COOR OPPOR UAI ITsoph PWR_US TC SZ_CU SZ_US 
DI_SPEC 0.837             
DI_IFI 0.170 0.887            
DI_AG 0.111 0.504 0.862           
DI_ISN 0.022 0.553 0.415 0.745          
UNC 0.018 0.364 0.387 0.388 0.901         
COOR 0.064 0.400 0.370 0.356 0.282 --        
OPPOR -0.124 -0.123 -0.117 -0.113 0.081 -0.090 --       
UAI -0.048 0.087 0.107 0.059 0.087 0.137 0.043 0.919      
ITsoph -0.037 0.119 0.160 0.127 0.173 0.142 0.090 0.283 0.734     
PWR_US 0.158 0.378 0.391 0.414 0.580 0.293 0.000 0.029 0.083 0.669    
TC 0.080 -0.131 -0.023 -0.089 -0.156 0.068 -0.130 -0.099 -0.001 -0.028 1.000   
SZ_CU -0.065 0.115 0.049 -0.008 -0.022 0.004 0.008 -0.018 0.013 -0.039 0.206 0.883  
SZ_US -0.026 0.267 0.167 0.140 0.168 0.179 -0.051 0.106 0.088 0.083 0.060 0.463 0.923 
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In summary, most constructs present good convergent and discriminant validity.  
Only two items present serious problems: IT_SOPH1 and PW_US1.  These two items are 
removed for the testing of the model.  At the construct level, we removed customer’s 
power from further analyses due to the issues mentioned above. 
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Chapter 6 Results and Discussion 
6.1 Analysis Techniques 
We used partial least square path modeling to test the hypotheses and multiple 
moderated regressions (MMR) for confirmation of results and additional statistical 
information.  While PLS is a valid technique for testing paths/relationships, it does not 
provide model estimates beyond the R2 for the criterion variable.  MMR, on the other 
hand, provides an F-test and an overall significance value for the model, plus F-values for 
changes in R2 for the direct and moderation effects.  In both cases (PLS and MMR) we 
use hierarchical entry mode by testing a model that includes only the control variables 
first (figure 13a), a model that includes the control and the direct effects second (figure 
13b) and the full model last (figure 13c).  We calculated variance inflation factors (VIF) 
for all independent variables to determine if multicollinearity was present.   We also 
similar analyses for all four components of digital integration.   
First we analyzed a model with digital integration as the criterion variable, the 
same model used for measurement validation.  This model allows us to test the 
hypotheses on the aggregate DI.  Second, we tested the effect of the predictor variables 
on each of the dimensions separately.  We do this to understand how the different 
predictors affect the different factors.  For example, we expect that coordination needs 
will have a different effect on the agency aspect of the relationship than on the 
information flows.  Tables 37 and 38 present summary results for changes in R2 between 
the hierarchical models for PLS and regression respectively, while Tables 39 and 40 
present summary results for path coefficients for PLS and regression respectively.  
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Detailed results are included in Appendices A and B for PLS and regression respectively.  
Additionally, we ran post hoc power analyses to evaluate the unsupported hypotheses.  
Table 40 summarizes the results from the post hoc power analyses.   
 
(a) Controls Variables 
Only 
 
(b) Control Variables and Direct Effects 
 
(c) Full Model 
Figure 13. Hierarchical entry models for DI 
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Table 37. R2 differential for PLS hierarchical models 
Model DI DI_SPEC DI_IFI DI_AG DI_ISN 
  
R2 R2 
diff. 
R2 R2 diff. R2 R2 
diff. 
R2 R2 
diff. 
R2 R2 
diff. 
1 Control Variables Only 0.155 0.155 0.038 0.038 0.094 0.094 0.043 0.043 0.085 0.085
2 Control Variables and 
Direct Effects 
0.459 0.303 0.170 0.133 0.338 0.245 0.295 0.253 0.312 0.227
3 All 0.473 0.014 0.201 0.030 0.351 0.013 0.333 0.038 0.349 0.037
 
 
Table 38. R2 differential for regression hierarchical models 
Model R2 R2 Change F-change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
DI 1 0.037 0.037 2.7302 3 211 0.045 
 2 0.286 0.249 11.8928 6 205 0.000 
 3 0.300 0.014 1.3323 3 202 0.265 
DI_SPEC 1 0.006 0.006 0.3927 3 211 0.758 
 2 0.093 0.087 3.2922 6 205 0.004 
 3 0.115 0.022 1.6640 3 202 0.176 
DI_IFI 1 0.081 0.081 6.2030 3 211 0.000 
 2 0.252 0.171 7.8031 6 205 0.000 
 3 0.254 0.002 0.1820 3 202 0.909 
DI_AG 1 0.028 0.028 2.0043 3 211 0.114 
 2 0.251 0.223 10.1792 6 205 0.000 
 3 0.265 0.014 1.3096 3 202 0.272 
DI_ISN 1 0.020 0.020 1.4320 3 211 0.234 
 2 0.184 0.164 6.8740 6 205 0.000 
 3 0.212 0.028 2.3499 3 202 0.074 
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Table 39. Path coefficients from PLS runs 
Test Relationship DI DI_SPEC DI_IFI DI_AG DI_ISN 
 DEM_TC -> DI -0.329 * 0.171  -0.152 * 0.189  -0.218 + 
 SZ_CU -> DI 0.036  -0.060  0.015  0.050  -0.084  
 SZ_US -> DI 0.226 * -0.070  0.269 ** 0.015  0.192 * 
 DEM_TC -> DI -0.122 + 0.047  -0.174 * -0.016  -0.112  
 SZ_CU -> DI 0.061  -0.149  0.090 + 0.068  -0.052  
 SZ_US -> DI 0.101 + 0.032  0.134 ** 0.041  0.084  
H1a UNC -> DI 0.231 * 0.111  0.129 + 0.180 + 0.161 * 
H1d COOR -> DI 0.296 ** 0.250 ** 0.286 ** 0.255 ** 0.263  
H1e OPPOR -> DI 0.152  -0.079  -0.160  0.121  0.138  
H2 UAI -> DI -0.018  0.050  0.012  0.031  -0.030  
H3a ITsoph -> DI 0.036  -0.098  0.044  0.065  0.066  
H3c PWR_US -> DI 0.267 * 0.225 * 0.209 * 0.216 * 0.219 * 
 DEM_TC -> DI -0.098  0.086  -0.155 * 0.015  -0.081  
 SZ_CU -> DI 0.085  -0.090  0.103 + 0.095  -0.042  
 SZ_US -> DI 0.096 + 0.020  0.129 * 0.031  0.091  
H1a UNC -> DI 0.236 * -0.097  0.129 * 0.208 + 0.180 * 
H1d COOR -> DI 0.321 ** 0.217 * 0.300 ** 0.274 ** 0.240  
H1e OPPOR -> DI 0.158  -0.086  -0.134  0.116  0.143  
H2 UAI -> DI -0.030  0.015  0.000  0.026  -0.023  
H3a ITsoph -> DI 0.037  -0.081  0.046  0.051  0.065  
H3c PWR_US -> DI 0.244 * 0.184 * 0.191 * 0.168 + 0.213 * 
H1b UNC * COOR -> DI 0.067  -0.073  0.033  0.044  0.147  
H1c UNC * OPPOR -> DI 0.030  0.144 + 0.048  0.131 + -0.137  
H3b ITsoph * PWR_US -> DI 0.094  0.121  0.103  0.142  0.104  
+ Significant at 0.10 (t>1.29, one tailed) 
* Significant at 0.05 (t>1.65, one tailed)  
** Significant at 0.01 (t>2.35, one tailed) 
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Table 40. Summary of regression results 
 Predictor DI DI_SPEC DI_IFI DI_AG DI_ISN 
F  7.2067 2.1837 5.7290 6.0748 4.5184 
Sig.  0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2  0.300 0.115 0.254 0.265 0.212 
 
 (Constant) 0.000  0.000 * 0.000  0.000  0.000 * 
 CON_SZC 0.024  -0.025  0.075  0.023  -0.019  
 CON_SZU 0.132 * -0.009  0.174 ** 0.108 + 0.079  
 DEM_TC -0.052  0.023  -0.134 * 0.003  -0.016  
H1a UNC 0.246 ** -0.088  0.234 ** 0.244 ** 0.315 ** 
H1d COOR 0.224 ** 0.220 ** 0.182 ** 0.198 ** -0.021  
H1e OPPOR -0.039  -0.077  -0.060  -0.027  0.083 + 
H2 CU_UAI -0.005  -0.097 + 0.025  0.052  0.015  
H3a IT_SOPH 0.063  0.002  0.048  0.100 + 0.025  
H3c PW_US 0.227 ** 0.137 + 0.169 * 0.186 ** 0.125 + 
H1b UNCxCOOR_std 0.038  -0.050  0.022  0.033  0.120 * 
H1c UNCxOP_std 0.083  0.142 * 0.037  0.114 * -0.087  
H3b PWxSPH_std 0.053  0.027  0.005  0.005  0.123 * 
+ Significant at 0.10 (one tailed) 
* Significant at 0.05 (one tailed) 
** Significant at 0.01 (one tailed) 
 
Only results for the full model are presented in this table.  Detailed results for hierarchical regression 
are included in Appedix C.   
 
These analyses show that all models (DI, DI_SPEC, DI_IFI, DI_AG, and 
DI_ISN) are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, with R2 ranging between 0.201 and 
0.473 for PLS (between 0.115 and 0.300 for MMR).  The MMR analyses offer results 
that are more conservative.  The reason for this may lie in the fact that PLS uses unequal 
loadings/weightings while for MMR the constructs are calculated as averages between 
the items (equal loadings), allowing for less flexibility in the parameter estimations.  As 
such, the inequalities in PLS lead to more accurate parameter estimates, and better 
results.  Moreover, MMR uses averages for constructs and thus has no sensitivity to 
measurement error.  At the same time, the results for individual effects are more similar 
between PLS and MMR, with MMR offering more power for a few coefficients.  VIFs 
were below 3 in all models, indicating that collinearity was not present. 
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These results are discussed in more detail in the following section. 
6.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Three of the nine hypotheses are supported by the analyses (Table 41). 
Table 41. Summary of results for support of hypotheses 
Determinants Eff. Hypothesis Support 
Aggregate 
Support 
Individual
Uncertainty Dir. H1a: Perceived environmental uncertainty 
is positively related to digital 
integration 
YES IFI 
AG 
ISN 
? 
Coordinatio
n needs 
Mod. H1b: The relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and digital 
integration is moderated by the 
intensity of coordination needs. 
NO Marginally 
for ISN 
? 
Opportunis
m 
Mod. H1c: The relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and digital 
integration is moderated by the 
intensity of opportunism risks. 
NO Marginally 
for SPEC 
and AG 
Coordination 
needs 
Dir. H1b: Coordination needs is positively 
related to digital integration. 
YES SPEC 
IFI 
AG 
Opportunism Dir. H1c: Opportunism is negatively related to 
digital integration. 
NO NO 
Culture (UAI) Dir. H2: Higher levels of national uncertainty 
avoidance are related to higher levels 
of digital integration 
NO NO 
IT 
sophistication 
Dir. H3a: Higher levels of IT sophistication are 
related to higher levels of digital 
integration.   
NO NO 
? Ability to 
Influence 
Mod. H3b: The impact of IT sophistication on 
digital integration is moderated by the 
ability to influence of the focus 
partner. 
NO Marginally 
for ISN 
Ability to 
Influence 
Dir. H3b: Ability to influence is related to 
digital integration. 
YES ALL 
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6.2.1 Cognitive Embeddedness (Uncertainty) 
Cognitive embeddedness refers to the effect of uncertainty, coordination needs 
and opportunism risks on digital integration.  We tested five hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1c, 
H1d, and H1e).  H1a, H1d and H1e are direct effects, while H1b and H1c are moderation 
effects.   
6.2.1.1 Direct effects 
H1a (the main hypothesis in the group) posits that uncertainty directly impacts 
digital integration.  H1a is supported at the aggregate (DI) level (p<0.05).  At the 
dimension level, H1a is supported for DI_IFI (p<.05) and both governance dimensions 
(DI_AG (p<0.10), DI_ISN (p<0.05)).  H1a is not supported for DI_SPEC.  These results 
suggest that market uncertainty influences the adoption of digital integration 
mechanisms, but different mechanisms are affected differently (e.g., monitoring and 
social norms are affected while relation-specific assets are not).  At the same time, 
uncertainty does lead to information sharing, but not necessarily to investment in 
relation-specific assets. 
H1d posits that coordination needs directly affects digital integration.  H1d is 
supported at the aggregate level (p<0.01) and at the dimension level for DI_SPEC 
(p<0.05), DI_IFI (p<0.01) and DI_AG (p<0.01).  H1d is not supported for DI_ISN.  
Moreover, PLS estimates the path coefficient with the hypothesized sign while MMR 
estimates the opposite.   
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H1e posits that opportunism risks negatively affects digital integration.  H1e is 
not supported at any level.  This result is somewhat surprising.  In the presence of 
opportunism risks we would expect organizations to increase monitoring mechanisms and 
decrease investment in relationship-specific assets.  The results do not support this 
viewpoint.   
6.2.1.2 Moderation effects 
H1b posits that the relationship between uncertainty and digital integration is 
moderated by coordination needs.  This hypothesis is not supported at any level (with the 
exception of the regression coefficient for DI_ISN).  While uncertainty and coordination 
do have separate effects on digital integration, they do not seem to interact.  That is, the 
impact of uncertainty on digital integration seems to be independent of the degree of 
coordination needs, and vice versa.  The one spurious coefficient merits further study in 
the future. 
H1c posits that the relationship between uncertainty and digital integration is 
moderated by opportunism risks.  This hypothesis is marginally supported for DI_SPEC 
(p<0.1) and DI_AG (p<0.1), while it’s not supported for DI_IFI and DI_ISN.  While 
significant at the ‘coefficient’ level, the change in R2 by the moderators in the 
hierarchical regressions is not significant at the model level (Table 45).  These results 
also merit further analysis. 
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6.2.2 Cultural Embeddedness (UAI) 
We posited that uncertainty avoidance directly impacts digital integration (H2).  
H2 is not supported at any level.  Of all the predictors, UAI had the lowest path 
coefficients.  UAI is also the variable with the lowest variance (mean: 6.25/7, mode: 
6.5/7, std. dev.: 0.72) as depicted in Figure 14.  To further test culture, we ran analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for both espoused UAI values items between the three countries.  
The test shows that there are no significant differences between the countries (Table 42).  
Moreover, the relative means do not correspond with Hofstede’s relative scores (Figure 
15).  While using espoused values present the advantage that we have a measure that is 
consistent with the unit of analysis, the language in the questions seems to be too strong 
and to lead to a ceiling effect and low variance.   
In this context, we retested for culture.  We ran two MMR: one with Hofstede’s 
scores for the country (US: 46, UK: 35, Germany: 65) and the second with dummy 
variables for country (anchored in UK, the country with the lowest UAI), instead of 
espoused values.  In neither model UAI is significant (UAI, t-stat = 0.005, sig. = 0.99; 
dummy USA, t-stat = 0.712, sig. = 0.48, dummy Germany, t-stat = 1.694, sig = 0.09).  
All dimensions of digital integration (DI_SPEC, DI_IFI, DI_AG and DI_ISN) show 
similar results.  Tables 43 and 44 present the results of MMR for digital integration for 
the two models (Hofstede’s scores and dummy variables for countries). 
Table 42. ANOVA for Cultural Items between countries.  
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CU_UAI (latent) 0.2290 2 0.1145 0.2171 0.805 
CU_UAI1 0.6261 2 0.3131 0.6906 0.502 
CU_UAI2 0.7254 2 0.3627 0.4459 0.641 
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Figure 14. Distribution of Culture Scores and Items 
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Figure 15. Means for UAI. 
 
Table 43. Regression results for post-hoc analysis of UAI with Hofstede’s scores (CNW_UAI) 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 3.4087 0.0186 0.221 (Constant)  9.262 0.000 0.000 
    CON_SZC -0.052 -0.636 0.526 1.374 
    CON_SZU 0.234 3.005 0.003 1.269 
    LOG_ACC -0.069 -0.946 0.345 1.103 
2 8.7530 0.0000 0.538 (Constant)  1.380 0.169 0.000 
    CON_SZC -0.002 -0.025 0.980 1.395 
    CON_SZU 0.155 2.215 0.028 1.324 
    LOG_ACC -0.055 -0.830 0.408 1.206 
    UNC 0.231 3.004 0.003 1.608 
    COOR 0.209 3.350 0.001 1.062 
    OPPOR -0.060 -0.965 0.336 1.038 
    IT_SOPH 0.082 1.309 0.192 1.076 
    PW_US 0.247 3.338 0.001 1.488 
    CNW_UAI -0.005 -0.077 0.939 1.037 
3 7.0969 0.0000 0.556 (Constant)  1.093 0.276 0.000 
    CON_SZC -0.007 -0.095 0.925 1.397 
    CON_SZU 0.178 2.516 0.013 1.378 
    LOG_ACC -0.047 -0.702 0.484 1.223 
    UNC 0.224 2.888 0.004 1.652 
    COOR 0.230 3.546 0.000 1.157 
    OPPOR -0.060 -0.981 0.328 1.039 
    IT_SOPH 0.077 1.206 0.229 1.118 
    PW_US 0.239 3.163 0.002 1.571 
    CNW_UAI 0.000 0.005 0.996 1.066 
    UNCxCOOR_std 0.048 0.735 0.463 1.194 
    UNCxOP_std 0.102 1.570 0.118 1.169 
    PWxSPH_std 0.056 0.838 0.403 1.216 
  
98
 
Table 44. Regression results for post-hoc analysis of UAI with dummy variables for countries 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 3.4087 0.0186 0.221 (Constant)   9.262 0.000 0.000 
    CON_SZC -0.052 -0.636 0.526 1.374 
    CON_SZU 0.234 3.005 0.003 1.269 
    LOG_ACC -0.069 -0.946 0.345 1.103 
2 8.4359 0.0000 0.552 (Constant)   1.315 0.190 0.000 
    CON_SZC 0.002 0.028 0.978 1.394 
    CON_SZU 0.131 1.873 0.063 1.359 
    LOG_ACC 0.036 0.401 0.689 2.184 
    UNC 0.223 2.882 0.004 1.652 
    COOR 0.222 3.564 0.000 1.074 
    OPPOR -0.044 -0.706 0.481 1.057 
    IT_SOPH 0.068 1.092 0.276 1.086 
    PW_US 0.224 2.996 0.003 1.545 
    DUMMY_USA 0.070 0.791 0.430 2.182 
    DUMMY_GE -0.116 -1.586 0.114 1.473 
0 7.0185 0.0000 0.571 (Constant)   1.084 0.280 0.000 
    CON_SZC -0.002 -0.032 0.975 1.397 
    CON_SZU 0.154 2.165 0.032 1.416 
    LOG_ACC 0.040 0.452 0.652 2.199 
    UNC 0.217 2.790 0.006 1.690 
    COOR 0.246 3.799 0.000 1.174 
    OPPOR -0.043 -0.707 0.481 1.057 
    IT_SOPH 0.060 0.945 0.346 1.139 
    PW_US 0.214 2.816 0.005 1.623 
    DUMMY_USA 0.063 0.712 0.477 2.188 
    DUMMY_GE -0.124 -1.694 0.092 1.498 
    UNCxCOOR_std 0.053 0.818 0.414 1.188 
    UNCxOP_std 0.094 1.454 0.148 1.173 
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6.2.3 Political Embeddedness (Power) 
Political embeddedness refers to the effect of power structures on digital 
integration.  We conceptualized power as consisting of two main factors: stimuli and 
ability to influence (power per se).  IT sophistication is a proxy for the stimulus to 
integrate digitally.  We tested three hypotheses: H3a and H3c represent the direct effects 
of stimuli and power.  H1b posits an interaction effect between stimuli and power.  
6.2.3.1 Direct effects 
H3a posits that IT sophistication directly impacts digital integration.  H3a is not 
supported at any level.  This is the most surprising result.  Not only because it makes 
sense intuitively, but also because a similar effect has been confirmed in previous 
research. 
H3c posits that the ability to influence the customer’s operations directly impacts 
digital integration.  H3c is supported at the aggregate level (p<0.01).  At the individual 
dimension level, H3c is supported for all dimensions (DI_SPEC (p<0.05), DI_IFI 
(p<0.05), DI_AG (p<0.1), DI_ISN (p<0.05)).   
6.2.3.2 Moderation effects 
H3c posits that the relationship between IT sophistication and digital integration 
is moderated by power.  This hypothesis is not supported at any level (except one 
spurious result for DI_ISN in regression analysis only).  MMR confirms these results.  In 
line with the null effect of IT sophistication, the lack of interaction effect is also 
surprising.  This result suggests that power has an effect on digital integration regardless 
  
100
of the degree of IT sophistication, while IT sophistication does not seem to have any 
(direct nor moderated) effect on digital integration. 
6.2.4 Control Variables 
Technological Culturation is significant for DI (on the controls-only model) and 
for DI_IFI.  Interestingly, in both cases TC presents a negative sign, which is opposite to 
prediction.  Company size is significant for DI (p<0.1) and DI_IFI (p<0.05).   
6.2.5 Power Analysis 
Post hoc power analyses are used to test whether we can reject an unsupported 
null hypothesis.  In other words, is there an effect that we cannot see (Type II error) or 
because it is not there?  Statistical power is related to the Type II error rate by the 
equation:  
P = 1 – β 
That is, the greater the power, the lower the probability of committing a Type II 
error.  Power answers the question: assuming that there is in fact an effect, what is the 
probability of not finding it?  With high power, we assume that if there was an effect, we 
should have found it.  A power equal or greater than 0.8 is the accepted standard.  In 
order to test for the lack of an effect in these hypotheses, we must first remove all 
confirmed (or supported) effects.  We then re-run the models (using MMR).  We then 
input the results into a statistical power calculator (Soper, D.S., 2008).  The results are 
presented in Table 45.  All models are non-significant (p>0.5) ; two of the models, 
however, do not meet the standards for power (p>.80). 
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Table 45. Summary of results from power analyses 
 Predict. 
Sample 
Size R2 Sig. Power 
Predictors 
DI 9 203 0.067 0.325 0.955 
Const., DEM_TC, CON_SZC, 
CU_UAI, OPPOR, IT_SOPH, 
UNCxCOOR, UNCxOP, PWxSPH 
DI_SPEC 9 203 0.035 0.484 0.885 
Const., DEM_TC, CON_SZC, 
CU_UAI, OPPOR, UNC, IT_SOPH, 
UNCxCOOR, PWxSPH. 
DI_IFI 8 203 0.050 0.149 0.792 
Const., CON_SZC, CU_UAI, 
OPPOR, IT_SOPH, UNCxOP, 
UNCxCOOR, PWxSPH 
DI_AG 9 203 0.068 0.063 0.785 
Const., DEM_TC, CON_SZU, 
CON_SZC, OPPOR, CU_UAI, 
IT_SOPH, UNCxCOOR, PWxSPH 
DI_ISN 9 203 0.051 0.206 0.835 
Const, DEM_TC, CON_SZU, 
CON_SZC, OPPOR, CU_UAI, 
COOR, IT_SOPH, UNCxOP 
1) We used Daniel Soper Post-hoc Statistical Power Calculator for Multiple Regression for the 
calculation of power (http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/calc09.aspx). 
2) Predictors: Constant, CON_SZC, DEM_TC, IT_SOPH, OPPOR, CU_UAI, UNCxOP, 
UNCxCOOR, PWxSPH.  Where any of these predictors was significant in a regression model, it 
was removed from the respective model here (e.g., DEM_TC was removed from DI_IFI power 
calculation) 
3) We excluded UNC, COOR, and PW_US from most models because these constructs were 
significant and on their own provide power upwards of .99 (UNC is included in the calculation of 
power for DI_SPEC, while COOR is included in the calculation of power for DI_ISN) 
4) As indicated by the significance, no model that includes unsupported hypotheses is significant. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Limitations 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this study we examined how the environment influences the degree of digital 
integration between supplier and customer.  More specifically, we looked at the impact of 
cognitive factors (market uncertainty, coordination needs and opportunism risks), cultural 
factors (uncertainty avoidance), and political factors (ability to influence and stimuli) on 
the adoption of inter-organizational informational mechanisms.  We further delved into 
the structure of digital integration.  We conceptualized it in terms of four distinct 
dimensions: relation-specific assets, information flows integration, agency mechanisms 
(monitoring), and information sharing norms. 
Our results show that uncertainty, coordination, and the ability to influence the 
customer have the most influence on digital integration, while uncertainty avoidance 
(culture) seems to have the least effect (Figure 16).  None of the interaction effects were 
supported by the data (except some spurious results which deserve further analysis).  
Also, we found different effects on different DI factors.   
For example, our results suggest that in conditions of high market uncertainty, 
organizations seek to establish tighter governance mechanisms (both formal and 
informal), while uncertainty seems to have no effect on investment in relationship-
specific informational assets.  We could speculate that in conditions of high market 
uncertainty, relationship-specific assets are risky investments, and organizations focus on 
governance mechanisms instead.   
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Figure 16. Summary of results 
 
Similarly, coordination needs seems to affect the existence of relation-specific 
informational assets, information flows integration and monitoring mechanisms, but not 
information sharing norms.  One possible explanation for the latter might be that high 
levels of coordination change the nature of “extraordinary” information.  Information 
sharing norms refers to the expectation of sharing information that is not normally shared 
in the relationship.  In conditions of high coordination (tighter relationships), only the 
most strategic information might be considered extraordinary, and therefore not shared.   
A surprising result was that DI was affected by power but not by IT 
Sophistication.  Two factors might lie behind this result: the prevalence of information 
technologies and the international context of our study.  Given these two factors, one 
might speculate that a good deal of the relationship is already electronically mediated.  
As such, IT sophistication loses its role as a stimulus, and the ability to influence the 
customer is enough to implement DI mechanisms. 
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7.1.1 Contributions for Theory 
The proposed study offers contributions to both theory and practice.  For theory, 
the study clarifies the concept of electronic integration.  Studies on integration in general 
and electronic integration in particular adopt a loose definition of integration. They all 
agree in that integration is the opposite of markets, but they define this opposite in 
different terms: relationship contracting, long-term contracting, coordination, etc.  We, in 
turn, define it further in terms of four components: informational relation-specific assets, 
information flows integration, informational agency mechanisms and information sharing 
norms.  Two of these represent governance mechanisms, while the other two are process 
oriented (assets and flows). 
Additionally, we investigate some of its environmental predictors.  We found that 
market uncertainty, coordination needs and power have significant effects on the extent 
of digital integration.  Furthermore, these predictors have somewhat different effects on 
the different components of digital integration.   
Finally, the study also responds to Wathne and Heide’s (2004) call for a more 
comprehensive study of governance mechanisms in B2B, with emphasis on monitoring 
mechanisms. 
7.1.2 Contributions for Practice 
For practice, the study offers a better understanding of the factors that enable or 
inhibit information-based B2B relationships.  In particular, the study shows that suppliers 
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are more likely to digitally integrate with those customers over whom they have power 
and in conditions of high uncertainty. 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
This study presents limitations that are inherent to the context as well as the 
methodology.  Contextually, the study has three limitations: it is based on one side of the 
relationship (supplier), the study is conducted in three western countries, and the 
participants are sourced from an existing panel with the stratification issues that arise 
from that.  Methodologically, the study has two limitations: all constructs are measured at 
once in the same instrument and the sample size. 
First, while some methodologists recommend having matching information from 
both sides of the relationship, we only had access to one side in our study.  This affects 
both the measurement of digital integration as a relationship-level construct as well as the 
generalizability of the study to the purchaser side.  While this approach is consistent with 
the vast majority of the literature in this area, it is still a limitation.  
Second, the fact that the study was conducted in only three western countries is 
both an advantage and a disadvantage of the study.  It is an advantage because it 
maximizes the variance in the selected cultural attribute while it minimizes the variance 
in all others.  At the same time, it is a disadvantage because the results are not 
generalizable to cultures that are significantly different from the west (i.e., Southern and 
Eastern Asia). 
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Third, the participants in the study all come from a single panel.  While the panel 
spans several industries and has a variety of firm sizes represented, there is a certain 
degree of self-selection in the makeup of the panel.  Additionally, because the data was 
gathered over a 2-week span, there is no way to test for non-response bias.  These 
characteristics present external validity challenges. 
Methodologically, the first limitation relates to the instrument.  The study presents 
the potential for mono-method bias (Cook and Campbell 1979) because all measures are 
included in the same instrument and gathered at the same time.  It is possible that the 
answers to some questions might affect the answers to others, not because of the 
underlying theoretical relations, but rather because of psychological reasons.  This is 
known as common methods bias, of course. 
The second (and final) methodological limitation is the sample size.  While the 
number of respondents is well above the recommended minimums for PLS to show 
significant results, they are not large enough to reject the unsupported hypotheses.  In our 
case, the minimum recommended sample size is 140 (10 x 14).  Fourteen is the number 
of predictors (between main, moderated and control effects) going into digital integration.  
This number yields a ratio of 1.4 observations per path.  A recent study by Goodhue et al. 
(2006) shows that PLS may not have more power than other statistical techniques.   
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7.3 Future Research 
This study leaves as many open questions as it provides answers.  This research 
did give a first look into many of the issues explored and there are many venues of future 
exploration.  The first would be to refine the definition of digital integration.  Possible 
areas of refinement include: finding better indicators, as some of those developed in this 
study suffered from discriminant validity issues.  Also a better definition of the 
process/coordination components would be helpful. 
A second venue of research could be to run a comparison between “domestic” and 
“international” B2B relationships.  We would expect to achieve stronger effects and 
maybe find significance in some of the unsupported hypotheses. 
A third venue of research might focus on furthering our understanding of 
individual types of environmental effects.  For example, of the cognitive factors, future 
studies might re-analyze the nature and role of opportunism risks and information 
sharing.  Alternatively, future research may also focus on a search for the nature of the 
stimuli to adopt digital integration mechanisms. 
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Appendix A: Detailed Coefficients for PLS Analysis 
Table 46. Detailed results for DI 
Model R2 Predictor Sample 
Loadings 
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
1 0.155 DEM_TC -0.329 -0.327 0.193 1.702 
  SZ_CU 0.036 0.020 0.177 0.203 
  SZ_US 0.226 0.237 0.125 1.799 
2 0.459 DEM_TC -0.122 -0.118 0.086 1.418 
  SZ_CU 0.061 0.040 0.092 0.661 
  SZ_US 0.101 0.108 0.062 1.620 
  UNC 0.231 0.228 0.116 1.982 
  COOR 0.296 0.305 0.079 3.725 
  OPPOR 0.152 -0.044 0.185 0.824 
  UAI -0.018 0.002 0.065 0.270 
  ITsoph 0.036 0.055 0.071 0.510 
  PWR_US 0.267 0.265 0.115 2.315 
3 0.473 DEM_TC -0.098 -0.070 0.104 0.950 
  SZ_CU 0.085 0.046 0.102 0.831 
  SZ_US 0.096 0.085 0.064 1.509 
  UNC 0.236 0.201 0.112 2.099 
  COOR 0.321 0.294 0.094 3.402 
  OPPOR 0.158 -0.022 0.179 0.883 
  UAI -0.030 0.003 0.070 0.431 
  ITsoph 0.037 0.060 0.073 0.507 
  PWR_US 0.244 0.237 0.118 2.065 
  UNC * COOR 0.067 -0.018 0.146 0.461 
  UNC * OPPOR 0.030 0.080 0.106 0.286 
  ITsoph * PWR_US 0.094 0.105 0.125 0.752 
For N=203, t > 1.29 is significant at 0.10 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 1.65 is significant at 0.05 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 2.35 is significant at 0.01 (one tailed) 
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Table 47. Detailed results for DI_SPEC 
Model R2 Predictor Sample 
Loadings 
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
1 0.038 DEM_TC 0.171 0.115 0.150 1.136 
  SZ_CU -0.060 -0.085 0.152 0.392 
  SZ_US -0.070 -0.023 0.117 0.598 
2 0.170 DEM_TC 0.047 0.044 0.103 0.455 
  SZ_CU -0.149 -0.097 0.124 1.205 
  SZ_US 0.032 0.001 0.093 0.346 
  UNC 0.111 -0.018 0.121 0.917 
  COOR 0.250 0.239 0.077 3.269 
  OPPOR -0.079 -0.093 0.127 0.618 
  UAI 0.050 -0.004 0.103 0.483 
  ITsoph -0.098 -0.054 0.130 0.752 
  PWR_US 0.225 0.187 0.109 2.070 
3 0.201 DEM_TC 0.086 0.063 0.101 0.845 
  SZ_CU -0.090 -0.057 0.115 0.785 
  SZ_US 0.020 0.007 0.095 0.207 
  UNC -0.097 -0.028 0.123 0.795 
  COOR 0.217 0.182 0.096 2.262 
  OPPOR -0.086 -0.073 0.127 0.676 
  UAI 0.015 -0.019 0.090 0.161 
  ITsoph -0.081 -0.041 0.116 0.696 
  PWR_US 0.184 0.152 0.094 1.954 
  UNC * COOR -0.073 -0.101 0.084 0.870 
  UNC * OPPOR 0.144 0.179 0.091 1.581 
  ITsoph * PWR_US 0.121 0.109 0.113 1.068 
For N=203, t > 1.29 is significant at 0.10 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 1.65 is significant at 0.05 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 2.35 is significant at 0.01 (one tailed) 
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Table 48. Detailed results for DI_IFI 
Model R2 Predictor Sample 
Loadings 
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error 
t-statistic 
1 0.094 DEM_TC -0.152 -0.163 0.079 1.939 
  SZ_CU 0.015 0.030 0.099 0.152 
  SZ_US 0.269 0.269 0.073 3.702 
2 0.338 DEM_TC -0.174 -0.162 0.074 2.341 
  SZ_CU 0.090 0.088 0.070 1.287 
  SZ_US 0.134 0.139 0.056 2.405 
  UNC 0.129 0.114 0.086 1.499 
  COOR 0.286 0.291 0.073 3.918 
  OPPOR -0.160 -0.123 0.152 1.053 
  UAI 0.012 0.013 0.065 0.188 
  ITsoph 0.044 0.073 0.071 0.619 
  PWR_US 0.209 0.213 0.094 2.218 
3 0.351 DEM_TC -0.155 -0.132 0.073 2.139 
  SZ_CU 0.103 0.101 0.071 1.446 
  SZ_US 0.129 0.125 0.058 2.242 
  UNC 0.129 0.111 0.078 1.661 
  COOR 0.300 0.293 0.071 4.235 
  OPPOR -0.134 -0.090 0.156 0.857 
  UAI 0.000 0.014 0.062 0.004 
  ITsoph 0.046 0.063 0.077 0.596 
  PWR_US 0.191 0.191 0.091 2.104 
  UNC * COOR 0.033 -0.002 0.082 0.403 
  UNC * OPPOR 0.048 0.069 0.084 0.573 
  ITsoph * PWR_US 0.103 0.069 0.117 0.878 
For N=203, t > 1.29 is significant at 0.10 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 1.65 is significant at 0.05 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 2.35 is significant at 0.01 (one tailed) 
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Table 49. Detailed results for DI_AG 
Model R2 Predictor 
Sample 
Loadings 
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error t-statistic 
1 0.043 DEM_TC 0.189 -0.035 0.202 0.935 
  SZ_CU 0.050 -0.002 0.146 0.343 
  SZ_US 0.015 0.141 0.119 0.124 
2 0.295 DEM_TC -0.016 -0.013 0.086 0.190 
  SZ_CU 0.068 0.036 0.116 0.587 
  SZ_US 0.041 0.055 0.080 0.514 
  UNC 0.180 0.153 0.123 1.468 
  COOR 0.255 0.251 0.099 2.574 
  OPPOR 0.121 -0.010 0.157 0.774 
  UAI 0.031 0.045 0.062 0.497 
  ITsoph 0.065 0.094 0.093 0.702 
  PWR_US 0.216 0.228 0.105 2.056 
3 0.333 DEM_TC 0.015 0.011 0.073 0.210 
  SZ_CU 0.095 0.048 0.117 0.807 
  SZ_US 0.031 0.044 0.073 0.430 
  UNC 0.208 0.146 0.134 1.550 
  COOR 0.274 0.244 0.082 3.329 
  OPPOR 0.116 -0.017 0.141 0.823 
  UAI 0.026 0.046 0.061 0.426 
  ITsoph 0.051 0.085 0.090 0.565 
  PWR_US 0.168 0.187 0.106 1.581 
  UNC * COOR 0.044 -0.027 0.104 0.428 
  UNC * OPPOR 0.131 0.165 0.101 1.304 
  ITsoph * PWR_US 0.142 0.064 0.175 0.808 
For N=203, t > 1.29 is significant at 0.10 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 1.65 is significant at 0.05 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 2.35 is significant at 0.01 (one tailed) 
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Table 50. Detailed results for DI_ISN 
Model R2 Predictor 
Sample 
Loadings 
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error t-statistic 
1 0.085 DEM_TC -0.218 -0.192 0.133 1.647 
  SZ_CU -0.084 -0.054 0.134 0.629 
  SZ_US 0.192 0.208 0.098 1.954 
2 0.312 DEM_TC -0.112 -0.117 0.092 1.222 
  SZ_CU -0.052 -0.020 0.096 0.545 
  SZ_US 0.084 0.080 0.070 1.188 
  UNC 0.161 0.152 0.093 1.730 
  COOR 0.263 -0.021 0.275 0.957 
  OPPOR 0.138 0.128 0.161 0.857 
  UAI -0.030 -0.004 0.071 0.425 
  ITsoph 0.066 0.078 0.071 0.934 
  PWR_US 0.219 0.215 0.096 2.286 
3 0.349 DEM_TC -0.081 -0.092 0.093 0.878 
  SZ_CU -0.042 -0.004 0.085 0.490 
  SZ_US 0.091 0.064 0.078 1.177 
  UNC 0.180 0.152 0.093 1.934 
  COOR 0.240 0.023 0.235 1.020 
  OPPOR 0.143 0.129 0.160 0.898 
  UAI -0.023 -0.006 0.068 0.337 
  ITsoph 0.065 0.077 0.078 0.832 
  PWR_US 0.213 0.196 0.104 2.054 
  UNC * COOR 0.147 0.106 0.155 0.947 
  UNC * OPPOR -0.137 -0.017 0.118 1.166 
  ITsoph * PWR_US 0.104 0.083 0.127 0.817 
For N=203, t > 1.29 is significant at 0.10 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 1.65 is significant at 0.05 (one tailed) 
For N=203, t > 2.35 is significant at 0.01 (one tailed) 
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Appendix B: Detailed Coefficients for Regression Analysis 
Table 51. Detailed results for DI 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 2.7302 0.045 0.037 (Constant)  10.854 0.000  
    CON_SZC -0.010 -0.128 0.898 1.328 
    CON_SZU 0.185 2.425 0.016 1.280 
    DEM_TC -0.083 -1.208 0.229 1.046 
2 9.1205 0.000 0.286 (Constant)  1.155 0.249  
    CON_SZC 0.030 0.433 0.666 1.357 
    CON_SZU 0.115 1.689 0.093 1.343 
    DEM_TC -0.065 -1.037 0.301 1.118 
    UNC 0.253 3.380 0.001 1.603 
    COOR 0.207 3.404 0.001 1.063 
    OPPOR -0.035 -0.586 0.559 1.044 
    CU_UAI 0.007 0.107 0.915 1.140 
    IT_SOPH 0.073 1.135 0.258 1.186 
    PW_US 0.237 3.267 0.001 1.516 
3 7.2067 0.000 0.300 (Constant)  1.207 0.229  
    CON_SZC 0.024 0.351 0.726 1.361 
    CON_SZU 0.132 1.898 0.059 1.395 
    DEM_TC -0.052 -0.827 0.409 1.136 
    UNC 0.246 3.232 0.001 1.666 
    COOR 0.224 3.536 0.001 1.155 
    OPPOR -0.039 -0.649 0.517 1.046 
    CU_UAI -0.005 -0.084 0.933 1.157 
    IT_SOPH 0.063 0.950 0.343 1.255 
    PW_US 0.227 3.060 0.003 1.592 
    UNCxCOOR_std 0.038 0.591 0.555 1.186 
    UNCxOP_std 0.083 1.279 0.202 1.217 
    PWxSPH_std 0.053 0.800 0.424 1.249 
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Table 52. Detailed results for DI_SPEC 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 0.3927 0.758 0.006 (Constant)  6.459 0.000  
    CON_SZC -0.044 -0.555 0.579 1.328 
    CON_SZU -0.030 -0.384 0.702 1.280 
    DEM_TC 0.052 0.746 0.457 1.046 
2 2.3342 0.016 0.093 (Constant)  1.988 0.048  
    CON_SZC -0.023 -0.292 0.771 1.357 
    CON_SZU -0.018 -0.233 0.816 1.343 
    DEM_TC 0.006 0.083 0.934 1.118 
    UNC -0.065 -0.767 0.444 1.603 
    COOR 0.228 3.326 0.001 1.063 
    OPPOR -0.071 -1.048 0.296 1.044 
    CU_UAI -0.092 -1.302 0.194 1.140 
    IT_SOPH 0.021 0.283 0.777 1.186 
    PW_US 0.146 1.788 0.075 1.516 
3 2.1837 0.014 0.115 (Constant)  2.213 0.028  
    CON_SZC -0.025 -0.318 0.751 1.361 
    CON_SZU -0.009 -0.110 0.913 1.395 
    DEM_TC 0.023 0.330 0.742 1.136 
    UNC -0.088 -1.033 0.303 1.666 
    COOR 0.220 3.086 0.002 1.155 
    OPPOR -0.077 -1.138 0.256 1.046 
    CU_UAI -0.097 -1.364 0.174 1.157 
    IT_SOPH 0.002 0.024 0.981 1.255 
    PW_US 0.137 1.641 0.102 1.592 
    UNCxCOOR_std -0.050 -0.696 0.487 1.186 
    UNCxOP_std 0.142 1.939 0.054 1.217 
    PWxSPH_std 0.027 0.371 0.711 1.249 
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Table 53. Detailed results for DI_IFI 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 6.2030 0.000 0.081 (Constant)  4.772 0.000  
    CON_SZC 0.042 0.556 0.579 1.328 
    CON_SZU 0.231 3.094 0.002 1.280 
    DEM_TC -0.161 -2.388 0.018 1.046 
2 7.6698 0.000 0.252 (Constant)  -0.989 0.324  
    CON_SZC 0.077 1.096 0.275 1.357 
    CON_SZU 0.166 2.371 0.019 1.343 
    DEM_TC -0.140 -2.184 0.030 1.118 
    UNC 0.239 3.122 0.002 1.603 
    COOR 0.174 2.801 0.006 1.063 
    OPPOR -0.059 -0.951 0.343 1.044 
    CU_UAI 0.029 0.456 0.649 1.140 
    IT_SOPH 0.048 0.733 0.464 1.186 
    PW_US 0.168 2.265 0.025 1.516 
3 5.7290 0.000 0.254 (Constant)  -0.962 0.337  
    CON_SZC 0.075 1.057 0.292 1.361 
    CON_SZU 0.174 2.429 0.016 1.395 
    DEM_TC -0.134 -2.070 0.040 1.136 
    UNC 0.234 2.985 0.003 1.666 
    COOR 0.182 2.780 0.006 1.155 
    OPPOR -0.060 -0.963 0.337 1.046 
    CU_UAI 0.025 0.386 0.700 1.157 
    IT_SOPH 0.048 0.704 0.482 1.255 
    PW_US 0.169 2.198 0.029 1.592 
    UNCxCOOR_std 0.022 0.326 0.744 1.186 
    UNCxOP_std 0.037 0.555 0.580 1.217 
    PWxSPH_std 0.005 0.073 0.942 1.249 
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Table 54. Detailed results for DI_AG 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 2.0043 0.114 0.028 (Constant)  8.887 0.000  
    CON_SZC -0.005 -0.058 0.954 1.328 
    CON_SZU 0.167 2.179 0.030 1.280 
    DEM_TC -0.037 -0.538 0.591 1.046 
2 7.6286 0.000 0.251 (Constant)  -0.284 0.777  
    CON_SZC 0.028 0.396 0.693 1.357 
    CON_SZU 0.088 1.251 0.212 1.343 
    DEM_TC -0.013 -0.196 0.845 1.118 
    UNC 0.262 3.418 0.001 1.603 
    COOR 0.186 2.980 0.003 1.063 
    OPPOR -0.023 -0.375 0.708 1.044 
    CU_UAI 0.061 0.939 0.349 1.140 
    IT_SOPH 0.103 1.558 0.121 1.186 
    PW_US 0.186 2.493 0.013 1.516 
3 6.0748 0.000 0.265 (Constant)  -0.285 0.776  
    CON_SZC 0.023 0.329 0.743 1.361 
    CON_SZU 0.108 1.518 0.131 1.395 
    DEM_TC 0.003 0.047 0.963 1.136 
    UNC 0.244 3.141 0.002 1.666 
    COOR 0.198 3.048 0.003 1.155 
    OPPOR -0.027 -0.434 0.665 1.046 
    CU_UAI 0.052 0.798 0.426 1.157 
    IT_SOPH 0.100 1.477 0.141 1.255 
    PW_US 0.186 2.450 0.015 1.592 
    UNCxCOOR_std 0.033 0.506 0.613 1.186 
    UNCxOP_std 0.114 1.720 0.087 1.217 
    PWxSPH_std 0.005 0.069 0.945 1.249 
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Table 55. Detailed results for DI_ISN 
Model F Sig. R2 Predictor Std. β t Sig. VIF 
1 1.4320 0.234 0.020 (Constant)  10.471 0.000  
    CON_SZC -0.030 -0.380 0.705 1.328 
    CON_SZU 0.135 1.754 0.081 1.280 
    DEM_TC -0.073 -1.046 0.297 1.046 
2 5.1397 0.000 0.184 (Constant)  2.436 0.016  
    CON_SZC -0.012 -0.161 0.872 1.357 
    CON_SZU 0.071 0.977 0.329 1.343 
    DEM_TC -0.011 -0.160 0.873 1.118 
    UNC 0.283 3.540 0.000 1.603 
    COOR -0.063 -0.961 0.338 1.063 
    OPPOR 0.082 1.273 0.204 1.044 
    CU_UAI 0.032 0.477 0.634 1.140 
    IT_SOPH 0.031 0.453 0.651 1.186 
    PW_US 0.147 1.891 0.060 1.516 
3 4.5184 0.000 0.212 (Constant)  2.292 0.023  
    CON_SZC -0.019 -0.267 0.790 1.361 
    CON_SZU 0.079 1.071 0.286 1.395 
    DEM_TC -0.016 -0.234 0.815 1.136 
    UNC 0.315 3.912 0.000 1.666 
    COOR -0.021 -0.313 0.754 1.155 
    OPPOR 0.083 1.296 0.196 1.046 
    CU_UAI 0.015 0.216 0.829 1.157 
    IT_SOPH 0.025 0.359 0.720 1.255 
    PW_US 0.125 1.587 0.114 1.592 
    UNCxCOOR_std 0.120 1.759 0.080 1.186 
    UNCxOP_std -0.087 -1.261 0.209 1.217 
    PWxSPH_std 0.123 1.767 0.079 1.249 
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Appendix C: Survey Instrument (U.S.A.) 
Notes 
 
General 
• Numbers in parentheses represent question number or coding scores and are not 
shown to subjects. 
• Question categories (e.g., cqS1) are shown.  Titles next to categories aren’t. 
• Questions not pertinent to the present study are not shown. 
Screening question 1 (cqS1) 
• Items are randomized. 
• Only those respondents who select “Sales/Business Development” move on to the 
next question and survey. 
 
Screening question 1 (cqS1) 
• Only those respondents who select items 2, 3, 4 or 5 move on to the next question 
and survey. 
 
Consent form (agreement) 
• Only those respondents who select “I agree” move on to the next question and 
survey. 
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Screening questions 
cqS1 
What best describes your current functional role at work? 
? Accounting / Finance (1) 
? Administration (2) 
? Communications / PR (3) 
? Customer Service (4) 
? Design / Engineering (5) 
? Human Resources (6) 
? Information Technology (7) 
? Marketing / Advertising (8) 
? Operations / Production (9) 
? Research and Development (10) 
? Sales / Business Development (11) 
? Other (12) 
 
cqS2 
Which of the following functions do you perform? 
? Sell products and/or services to Domestic clients ONLY (1) 
? Sell products and/or services to International clients ONLY (2) 
? Sell products and/or services to Domestic AND International clients (but mostly Domestic clients) (3) 
? Sell products and/or services to Domestic AND International clients (but mostly International clients) (4) 
? Sell products and/or services to a fairly even mix of Domestic AND International clients (5) 
? I do not sell products and/or services – I am responsible for another aspect of business development within my company (6) 
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Agreement – Consent Form  
cqS3 
Digital integration: an international study 
Introduction:   
The goal of this study is to understand what factors impact information sharing between companies and across borders.     
Risks and Benefits:   
The following survey is similar to other e-Rewards surveys.  The risks and benefits that would result from completing the survey are comparable 
to those.  There is no risk in participating in this study.  There will not be any direct benefits for you other than the e-Reward dollars.     
You can choose not to answer any question. If you choose to withdraw from the study, we will not use any data we have collected from you to that 
point.  Compensation will be based on the completion of the survey as per the Membership Agreement.    
The study will hopefully lead to improvements in inter-organizational processes.  It should also help organizations to better assess their inter-
organizational systems and procedures.    
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:    
Participation in research is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you 
have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or discontinue participation at any time. Any data collected to that point will not be 
used.     
Confidentiality:    
As per e-Rewards policy, your name will not be shared with the requestor of the survey.  Your name will not be associated to your responses.  The 
findings of this study will be summarized and reported in group form.   
Consent:    
If you agree to the terms indicated above, please click “I agree”.  Otherwise, click I disagree. 
? I agree (1) 
? I disagree (2) 
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Non-relationship Questions  
cq1 
Answer the questions that relate to your company from your firm’s perspective rather than your own.  Please note that you don’t have to provide 
your company’s name. Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following: 
 Strongly 
agree (1) 
Agree (2) Slightly 
agree (3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(5) 
Disagree 
(6) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(7) 
Rules and regulations are important because they inform 
workers what the organization expects of them. (1)        
Order and structure are very important in a work environment. 
(2)        
Information technology is important for the reduction of 
personnel in our organization. (12)        
Information technology is important for the reduction of 
operational costs in our organization. (13)        
Information technology is important for the improvement of 
productivity in our organization. (14)        
Information technology is important for the improvement of 
access to information in our organization. (15)        
Information technology is important for the improvement of the 
quality of decision making in our organization. (16)        
Information technology is important for the improvement of 
competitiveness in our organization. (17)        
Information technology is important for the improvement of 
service to customers in our organization. (18)        
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cq2 
Please indicate what best represents your situation: 
 Very Negative 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Very Positive 
(7) 
Please rate the attitude of your top management toward the deployment of information 
technology in your organization. (19)        
 
Relationship-related Questions  
cq3 
For the following questions:  Please select your most critical foreign customer and answer questions using it as a reference point.  A foreign 
customer is an organization from another country that provides your company with a good or service.    Answer the questions that relate to your 
company from the firm’s perspective rather than your own.  Please note that you don’t have to provide your company’s name.   Please indicate 
your level of agreement with each of the following: 
 
Strongly 
agree (1) Agree (2) 
Slightly 
agree (3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(5) 
Disagree 
(6) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(7) 
Nearly all delivery schedules are shared electronically with our 
foreign customer. (23)        
Nearly all performance metrics are shared electronically with 
our foreign customer. (24)        
Inventory and/or service capacity data are electronically visible 
to our foreign customer (25)        
In this relationship, it is expected that nearly all information that 
might help our foreign customer will be provided to them. (26)        
It is expected that our firm and our foreign customer will readily 
provide proprietary information if it can help the other party. 
(28) 
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Strongly 
agree (1) Agree (2) 
Slightly 
agree (3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(5) 
Disagree 
(6) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(7) 
It is expected that our firm and our foreign customer will keep 
each other informed about events or changes that may affect the 
other party. (29) 
       
Our firm regularly monitors the quality control maintained by 
our foreign customer. (30)        
Our firm frequently monitors the marketing activities performed 
by our foreign customer. (31)        
Our firm closely monitors the extent to which our foreign 
customer follows established procedures. (32)        
Our foreign customer can easily buy from other firms besides 
us. (33)        
We can easily sell to other firms besides our customer. (34) 
        
We have a significant influence on our foreign customer’s 
operations. (35)        
Our foreign customer has a significant influence on our 
operations. (36)        
We can pretty much dictate how our foreign customer sells their 
product. (37)        
Consumer demand is very predictable for those products that 
use the components we source to our foreign customer. (38)        
Sales forecasts are very predictable for those products that use 
the components we source to our foreign customer. (39)        
Retail sales are very predictable for those products that use the 
components we source to our foreign customer. (40)        
Our company accomplishes our assigned tasks (i.e., production 
or service) independently from our foreign customer. (42)        
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Strongly 
agree (1) Agree (2) 
Slightly 
agree (3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(5) 
Disagree 
(6) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(7) 
The companies in our supply network go to a lot of trouble to 
coordinate each task (i.e., production or service order). (43)        
It is very difficult to evaluate accurately the quality of the 
resources or assets our foreign customer says it brings to the 
exchange. (44) 
       
It is very difficult to evaluate the quality of the resource or 
assets our foreign customer is actually offering in exchange. 
(45) 
       
We cannot be sure if our foreign customer has put forth 
maximal effort. (46)        
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IOS&K Specificity 
cq5 
For the following quetions:  Please select your most critical foreign customer and answer questions using it as a reference point.  A foreign 
customer is an organization from another country that provides your company with a good or service.    Answer the questions that relate to your 
company from the firm’s perspective rather than your own.  Please note that you don’t have to provide your company’s name.   Please indicate 
what best represents your situation: 
 Relatively similar to 
other customers (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Customized for our 
foreign customer (7) 
Software and applications (e.g., billing, ordering, inventory 
management, and EDI) are unique to our foreign customer. (48)        
The knowledge needed for planning new products and programs is 
unique to our foreign customer. (49)        
The knowledge needed in product conception and design is unique 
to our foreign customer. (50)        
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Customer Size 
cq9 
Revenues of your foreign customer (roughly; in dollars): 
? Less than $3,000,000 (1) 
? $3,000,000 – $14,999,999 (2) 
? $15,000,000 - $74,999,999 (3) 
? $75,000,000 - $399,999,999 (4) 
? More than $400,000,000 (5) 
cq10 
Given the number of employees in your foreign customer, they are a: 
? Micro enterprise (1-9 employees) (1) 
? Small enterprise( 10-49 employees) (2) 
? Medium enterprise (50-249 employees) (3) 
? Medium-large enterprise (250-1000 employees) (4) 
? Large enterprise (1000+ employees) (5) 
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Demographics: Organization 
cq18 
Please provide the following information: Your  firm revenues (roughly; in dollars): 
? Less than $3,000,000 (1) 
? $3,000,000 – $14,999,999 (2) 
? $15,000,000 - $74,999,999 (3) 
? $75,000,000 - $399,999,999 (4) 
? More than $400,000,000 (5) 
cq19 
Given the number of employees in your firm, your firm is a: 
? Micro enterprise (1-9 employees) (1) 
? Small enterprise (10-49 employees) (2) 
? Medium enterprise (50-249 employees) (3) 
? Medium-large enterprise (250-1000 employees) (4) 
? Large enterprise (1000+ employees) (5) 
cq21 
In which country is your company’s headquarters located? 
 (1) ______________________________
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cq26 
Industry 
? Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (1) 
? Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction (2) 
? Utilities (3) 
? Construction (4) 
? Manufacturing (5) 
? Wholesale Trade (6) 
? Retail Trade (7) 
? Transportation and Warehousing (8) 
? Information [communications] (9) 
? Finance and Insurance (10) 
? Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (11) 
? Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (12) 
? Management of Companies and Enterprises (13) 
? Administrative and Support [Services] and Waste Management and Remediation Services (14) 
? Educational Services (15) 
? Health Care and Social Assistance (16) 
? Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (17) 
? Accommodation and Food Services (18) 
? Other Services (except Public Administration) (19) 
? Public Administration (20) 
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Demographics: Professional 
cq15 
Please provide the following information: Work experience (years): 
 (1) ______________________________
cq16 
How many people report to you? 
 (1) ______________________________
cq17 
Current or last position : 
? Top Management (1) 
? Middle Management (2) 
? Supervisory Management (3) 
? Professional or Administrative position (4) 
cq22 
In which country are you currently working? 
 (1) ______________________________
cq23 
How many years have you worked in an international division? 
 (1) ______________________________
cq25 
In how many countries have you worked? 
 (1) ______________________________
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Demographics: Personal 
cq11 
Please provide the following information: Age 
 (1) ______________________________
cq12 
Gender: 
? Male (1) 
? Female (2) 
cq13 
 Country of birth: Years lived: 
 (1) ______ ______ 
cq14 
 Current country where you live: Years lived:
 (1) ______ ______ 
cq20 
Highest degree obtained: 
? High school (1) 
? Undergraduate (2) 
? Master’s (3) 
? Doctorate (4) 
cq24 
Number of trips abroad in last 10 years: 
 (1) ______________________________
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